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ABSTRACT 
MOOD AND CREATIVITY: THE MEDIATING ROLE OF ATTENTION 
Viktoria Tidikis 
Old Dominion University, 2012 
Director: Dr. Ivan Ash 
Within literature there are two opposing views regarding the role of emotions in the 
creative process. The most commonly held view contends that positive emotions enhance 
creativity, while negative emotions stifle it; yet, some studies show an opposite trend. To 
help resolve this conundrum, this research examined the mediating effect of attention on 
the relationship between mood and creativity. The results showed that positive 
deactivating and negative activating emotions led to broader attention, while positive 
activating and negative deactivating emotions caused narrowing of attention. 
Furthermore, the creative process is not uniform in its requirements of attentional 
breadth; some creative tasks require broad and others narrow attention for their 
completion. When differential requirements for global versus local attentional focus at 
the differing stages of creativity were taken into consideration, the influence of emotions 
become more straightforward; different attentional breadth requirements corresponded to 
differential stages of creative performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The current research investigates how emotions affect creativity processes and 
whether attentional breadth plays a mediating role in that. This question is investigated 
using a multi-stage creativity model paradigm. To test this question, emotional valence 
and arousal levels were manipulated and their effect on different measures of creativity 
and attentional breadth were measured. 
First, this paper reviews existing research regarding the relationships connecting 
mood, attention, and creativity. Second, it discusses how conflicting findings within the 
literature might be explained by use of a multi-stage creativity model. Third, a study that 
manipulates mood and arousal, and measures the effect on multiple measures of 
creativity and attention is reported. And finally, these results are discussed in terms of 
current theories of creative cognitive processes and attentional breadth. 
The Role of Emotions in the Creative Process 
The importance of emotions in the creative process has been fully appreciated 
since ancient times throughout western civilization. The link between emotions and 
creativity has been well documented through a host of anecdotal evidence, self-reports of 
prominent artists and scientists alike, as well as empirical research. Despite 
overwhelming agreement that emotions play an important role in the creative process, 
little agreement exists as to what type of emotions enhance and what type of emotions 
stifle creativity. Three distinct views exist. The first holds that positive emotions enhance, 
while negative emotions stifle creativity (e.g., meta-analytical study by Davis, 2009). The 
second proposes the opposite, that negative emotions promote creativity, while positive 
emotions suppress it (e.g., Akinola & Mendes, 2008),). Yet, a third view posits that both 
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positive and negative emotions are necessary for the creative process to occur (e.g., meta-
analytical study by Baas, De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008). Consequently, on one hand, there is 
an overwhelming body of evidence linking positive affect with creativity; many 
researchers finding evidence of artists and scientists alike experiencing states during the 
creative process, which are described as "flow" (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), complete 
absorption in the present moment (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2009), elation, 
emotional high, and even giddiness (Schuldberg, 1994). 
On the other hand, multiple anecdotal evidence suggests that negative emotions 
are vastly more important for creativity than are positive emotions. Such prominent 
creators as Robert Shumann, Hector Berlioz, Winston Churchill, Van Gogh, among many 
others, were diagnosed with mood and personality disorders such as depression, bipolar 
disorder, and schizophrenia (Bowden, 1994). Yet other evidence suggests that the 
creative process is marked by both positive and negative affect simultaneously 
(Shuldberg, 1994). Both artists and scientists report experiencing heightened positive and 
negative emotions at the same time during peak creative experiences (Shaw & Runco, 
1994). 
Abele (1992) suggested that there are two ways in which mood affects creativity: 
one is through affecting task motivation by affecting interest to engage in a task, and 
another is through affecting cognitive functioning. The current study concentrates on the 
effects of mood on cognitive functioning. It has been shown that positive mood broadens 
attention, while negative mood narrows it (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2002; Fredrickson & 
Branigan, 2005). A link between attention and creativity has also been established. 
Breadth of attention has been shown to influence performance on creative tasks (e.g., 
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N^cka, 1999; Mendelsohn, 1976; Kasof, 1997). Thus, it is conceivable that mood can 
influence creativity through attention, by broadening or narrowing attentional focus, 
which in turn, affects creative task performance. 
In the present study mood was manipulated by presenting the participants with a 
series of emotion-educing images designed to elicit either positive or negative emotions 
at differing arousal levels. The effects of emotions across different arousal levels were 
measured on a set of attention and creativity tasks. Attention tasks were designed to 
measure the attentional breadth, while creativity tasks were designed to capture different 
facets of the creative process. 
Studying Creativity 
Creativity is a multifaceted construct and is generally conceptualized as the 
"generation of ideas, insights, or problem solutions that are both novel and potentially 
useful" (Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008, p. 780). While novelty and usefulness are 
necessary, they are not in themselves sufficient conditions for creativity. For example, 
ideas can be novel, yet nonsensical. Additionally, ideas must be appropriate and valid 
(Vosburg and Kaufman, 1999). According to Kaufman (1993), validity encompasses the 
significance and meaningfulness of an idea, the internal consistency of a theoretical 
model, the esthetic value of an artistic products, functionality of a device, or a novel 
social practice. Another important component of creativity is the rejection or 
modification of previously accepted ideas. Boden (1991) described this as "thinking the 
impossible" or a fundamental departure from "the basic rules of a particular conceptual 
space" (Vosburg & Kaufman, 1999, p. 20). 
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Multiple theories have been put forth to explain how creative ideas are developed. 
Some theorists (Mendelsohn, 1976; Mednick, 1962) proposed that creative individuals 
differ from those less creative by their ability to access larger amounts of various mental 
concepts. This ability greatly depends on an individual's ability to control attention. The 
more stimuli an individual can simultaneously attend to, or the more defocused one's 
attention is, the more creative the individual (Mendelsohn, 1976). 
One of the most important questions in creativity research is how to study and 
measure it. Different approaches to studying creativity have evolved throughout history: 
mystical, pragmatic, psychodynamic, psychometric, cognitive, social-personality, and 
multidisciplinary (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). Proponents of the psychometric approach 
(Guilford, 1950) were the first to propose that creativity can be studied employing 
everyday participants using paper-and-pencil tasks. While this approach was a 
breakthrough in creativity studies and made it possible to study different components of 
creativity in the laboratory, it ignored the complexity of the creative process. Researchers 
applying a cognitive approach to studying creativity tried to understand how mental 
representations are formed and what cognitive processes underlie creativity. Based on a 
cognitive approach, Finke, Ward, and Smith (1992) created the Geneplore model, which 
presents creativity as a two-stage process. The first stage is generative and is associated 
with the construction of mental representations. The second stage is exploratory, during 
which the mental representations constructed during the first stage foster the appearance 
of novel and creative ideas. A social-personality approach looked at personality and 
motivational variables, as well as the sociocultural environment as triggers of creativity. 
While both cognitive and social-personality approaches have contributed separately to 
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creativity research, few studies have sought to integrate the two. Later approaches have 
attempted to correct this shortcoming by proposing that multiple components need to 
converge in order for the creative process to occur (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). 
Creativity has been measured using widely different methods, such as divergent 
thinking and idea generation tasks, insight problems, as well as employing subjective 
ratings of creativity (Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). A question arises of whether these 
differing measures are measuring the same construct. For example, divergent thinking 
tasks are open-ended and measure the ability to produce multiple unorthodox ideas 
(Mumford, 2001). Whereas, insight problems have only one possible solution, and 
require restructuring of the problem's mental representation in order to successfully solve 
it (Simonton, 2003). Yet other studies asked participants to write a poem, draw a picture, 
or perform another loosely defined task; participants' performance was then subjectively 
appraised by independent judges using some kind of scale (e.g., Simonton, 2003). Since 
different psychological processes might be responsible for different aspects of creative 
performance, it is questionable whether these varying tasks provide a measurement for 
the same underlying construct (Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). Hence, different 
emotional and attentional states might differentially influence performance on various 
tasks. 
In the current study, multiple facets of creativity were measured using two 
problem types: insight and open-ended problems. For insight problems, solution credit 
was given if the problem was correctly solved. For open-ended problems, there was no 
right or wrong answer; for these problems, the solution's creative quality was measured 
using fluency, originality and usefulness measures. For both problem types there were 
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two subtypes, each requiring either a broad or narrow attentional focus in order to 
achieve a successful solution. Thus, different problems were selected to represent 
different stages of the creative process; problems requiring a broad attentional focus were 
designed to simulate the early stages of creativity, while problems requiring a narrow 
attentional focus were designed to simulate later stages of the creative process. 
De fining Affect 
Affective phenomenon is most commonly described as emotion, mood and affect. 
Emotion is usually directed towards a specific stimulus, and is characterized as being 
intense, but short lasting. Mood is generally seen as being more durable and persistent, 
but usually of a lower intensity. Affect is the most general of the three, referring to the 
most enduring, long-lasting mood states (Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). Despite the 
distinction, these three terms are often used interchangeably in research. There are 
numerous dimensions in which mood differs, however, three most studied dimensions are 
hedonic tone, activation, and approach/avoidance orientation. Hedonic tone refers to the 
valence of emotions, that is whether it is positive or negative. Activation refers to 
whether the emotion is calming and deactivating (e.g., calm, relaxed, sad), or activating 
(e.g., happy, elated, angry, fearful). Based on these two dimensions, moods can be both 
positive or negative, and activating or deactivating (Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). 
These two dimensions have applicability to temporary moods as well as trait-related 
differences in emotional states; such as extraversion being related to positive and 
activating states. The difference between approach and avoidance orientation is based on 
the regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000) that 
distinguishes between promotion focus and prevention focus. Approach/avoidance 
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orientation has mostly been studied in relation to more enduring traits and personality 
characteristics. 
Breadth of Attention 
Kasof (1997) referred to breadth of attention as "the number and range of stimuli 
attended to at any one time" (p.303). People exhibiting a narrow state of attention focus 
on a relatively small range of stimuli and filter irrelevant stimuli from their awareness. 
Conversely, people having a broad state of attention focus on a large range of stimuli and 
tend to be more aware of irrelevant stimuli. In the field of visual attention research, 
Navon (1977) pointed out that the breadth of attention corresponds to the way 
information is processed: broad, or global attention, corresponds to global-to-local, or 
top-down information processing, which is how humans tend to process information 
under normal circumstances. Gestalt psychologists posited that humans process 
information holistically, a view that was later developed into the global-precedence 
hypothesis that was supported by a multitude of research (Kimchi, 1992). However, later 
research disputes the inevitability of top-down processing (e.g., Van der Stigchel, 
Belopolsky, Peters, Wijnen, Meeter, & Theeuwes, 2009). For example, Van der Stigchel 
et al. argue that initially information is briefly processed in a bottom-up manner, and only 
then do top-down processes assume control. Top-down processing can also influence the 
size of attentional window, i.e., broaden or narrow attention based on the demands of the 
environment. A similar distinction has been made in perceptual processing research 
between contextually and conceptually driven processing (Reicher, 1969). Contextual 
processing is guided by sensory information, which corresponds to a narrowing of 
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attention on a task; while conceptually driven processing is guided by concepts stored in 
long-term memory, which corresponds to broad attentional focus. 
Mood and Creative Thinking 
Overall, there is a large body of literature showing the positive relationship 
between positive emotions and creativity. Conversely, a substantial number of studies 
demonstrate a positive relationship between negative emotions and creativity, and a 
negative relationship between positive emotions and creativity. One explanation for these 
inconsistencies might be that various studies used different methods to induce mood, 
which would enhance different components of the mood construct. If we treat mood as a 
multidimensional construct with different correlates (Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008), 
then it is conceivable that diverse mood induction methods activate different segments of 
the mood construct. The same applies to the creativity construct and its measures: 
differing tasks might in fact measure disparate aspects of the creative process. 
Effects of Positive Mood on Creativity 
Overall the effect of positive mood on the creative process is well established 
throughout creativity literature; multiple studies found that positive mood enhances 
creativity on an array of differing tasks. Specifically, positive emotions appear to enhance 
performance on tasks requiring broad, defocused attention more so than on those 
requiring a narrow, concentrated scope of attention. 
A meta-analysis by Baas, De Dreu and Nijstad (2008) examined mood and 
creativity research conducted between 1984 and 2008. The authors tested whether there 
were differences between positive and neutral, negative and neutral, and positive and 
negative moods in their effect on creativity by examining 102 effect sizes. Overall, they 
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found that positive moods were more conducive to creativity than neutral moods and that 
there was no significant difference between negative and neutral moods, or positive and 
negative moods. However, when the authors coded for separate components of creativity, 
such as eureka/insight tasks, flexibility, fluency, and originality; a more complicated 
pattern emerged. When examined separately, the authors found a significant difference 
between positive and negative, and positive and neutral moods for eureka/insight tasks. 
Positive moods were associated with more creativity than were neutral or negative 
moods; however, no difference was found between negative and neutral moods. For the 
flexibility, fluency and originality components of creativity there was significant 
difference for all three contrasts (between negative and neutral, positive and neutral, and 
positive and negative moods). Positive mood was associated with more creativity than 
were neutral or negative moods, and negative mood was associated with more creativity 
than was neutral mood. 
Yet another meta-analysis examined a total of 72 studies in order to evaluate 
whether positive moods enhance creativity (Davis, 2009). Overall, this study found a 
significant effect between positive and negative, and positive and neutral moods; with 
positive mood being associated with higher creativity. No difference was found between 
neutral and negative moods. Davis' study also found that these effects were dependent on 
the type of creative task used. The author separated task types into two categories: 
ideation and problem-solving. The results showed that there was a significant difference 
for positive versus negative, and positive versus neutral moods for ideation tasks, but not 
for problem-solving tasks. Thus, problem-solving performance was not affected by 
differential mood states. Furthermore, there was a more robust difference between 
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positive and neutral than between positive and negative moods for ideation task creativity 
enhancement. 
In a series of studies, Isen and colleagues investigated the effects of mood on 
creative performance. In their 1984 study, Isen and Daubman examined the influence of 
mood on categorization. In a pilot study, aimed at establishing a relationship between 
positive mood and categorization, the participants were induced with positive 
deactivating mood. A categorization task, used as a dependent measure, required the 
participants to pick an exemplar that was the most representative of a given category, and 
then rate these items based on how closely they represented a category. The results of the 
study were mixed, only about half the time did participants in the deactivating positive 
affect condition were more likely to rate unusual exemplars as members of a category. 
The following study included both positive and negative mood conditions. No 
information about whether mood was activating or deactivating was recorded. The results 
showed that participants in the positive mood condition rated more poor exemplars as 
category members, and likewise rated them higher than controls. A similar trend was 
found for the negative mood group, however, the effect did not reach the customary 
significance level. In a subsequent experiment, Isen and Daubman found no difference in 
the number of categories that the participants created in the positive and negative mood 
conditions, however, these both conditions created significantly fewer categories than the 
control group. While a lack of significant effect for the negative mood condition hindered 
further investigation, the authors' interpretation of these findings was that negative affect 
might influence categorization in the same manner as positive affect. 
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In the next study, Isen, Johnson, Mertz, and Robinson (1985) looked at the effect 
of positive mood on word associations. Creativity was measured by the unusualness of 
word associations. Results showed that people within the positive affect condition 
produced a greater amount of unusual word associations than did people in the neutral 
condition. Thus positive mood led to better performance on divergent thinking tasks, 
which required a broadening of attention. 
In a four-experiment study Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki (1987) looked at mood 
effects on creativity using candle task (Duncker, 1945) and the Remote Associates Test 
[(RAT) Mednick, Mednick, & Mednick, 1964)]. The study included positive, negative, 
and neutral mood groups, as well as high arousal group, in which arousal was induced by 
asking participants to exercise for two minutes. Participants in the positive mood 
condition solved more candle problems than any other group. No difference in problem 
solving time was detected among the groups. A comparison of the positive affect 
condition (induced by gift giving) with the neutral condition revealed that participants in 
the positive mood condition solved significantly more medium-difficulty items on RAT, 
than did participants in the control group. No difference was found for low- or high-
difficult items. In another experiment comparing a positive group (shown a comedy video 
clip) with a control and arousal group (exercise), there was a significant RAT score 
difference between the positive and control groups, but not between the positive and 
arousal groups. Thus, while the study found a solid effect of positive mood on solving a 
candle task across conditions, only in one out of three conditions on the RAT task similar 
effect was found. 
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A possible explanation for these results might be that the two tasks were tapping 
into different components of creativity. While the candle task is universally accepted as a 
measure of divergent thinking (Duncker, 1945), the question of whether the RAT task is a 
measure of divergent or convergent thinking still remains open, many consider RAT to be 
more closely related to convergent rather than divergent thinking (e.g., Taft & Rossiter, 
1966). Overall, the study found that positive mood aided performance on creativity 
measures, however, the effects of positive mood did not differ from the effects of arousal. 
Finally, since only one out of four experiments in this study used a negative mood 
condition, a decisive conclusion cannot be reached regarding the effects of negative 
mood on creativity, or lack of thereof, based on this study. 
Abele's (1992) study analyzed the effects of various moods on verbal creativity 
tasks. The researcher used unusual uses (UU) and fictitious situation (FS) tests as 
measures of creativity. The UU test was intended as a low instrumental task; herein, 
participants were asked to produce as many unusual uses as possible for and empty can 
and ordinary string. The FS test measured "logical extrapolation of experiences into a 
novel situation" (p.206) and was considered a high instrumental interest task; participants 
were instructed to produce as many ideas as possible for the fictitious situation of "what 
would happen if one were able to listen to [another] person's secret thoughts (p. 207). 
The results showed that positive mood increases ideation fluency across both tasks; 
whereas negative mood increased ideation fluency on a high instrumental interest task, 
but not on a low instrumental interest task. In this study, it is possible to compare high 
and low instrumental tasks in terms of the breadth of attention required throughout the 
performance of each. The high instrumental task called for narrower attention than did 
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the low instrumental task, as it asked participants to deal with a concrete situation, and 
then extrapolate analytically from it to a wider domain, thus engaging "tighter", more 
analytical, and "bottom up" processes. Conversely, the low instrumental task entailed 
broader attention, as it required participants to find any unusual use for an object, thus 
engaging looser, "top down" information processing. 
Subramaniam, Kounios, Parrish, and Jung-Beeman's (2008) study looked at the 
effects of different levels of mood on insight problem solving. There was no mood 
induction in this study; participants were separated into three equal groups based on the 
valence of their moods as measured during the experiment. A top, middle, and bottom 
groups were created, thus authors treated mood as a uni-dimensional variable. RAT was 
used as a measure of creativity. The researchers found that participants in the top third 
mood condition solved more problems than did the participants in the other two 
conditions. Of interest here, they found that positive mood was related to the strategy that 
participants used to solve problems. The number of insights was significantly different 
across the three mood conditions, however, the number of problems solved analytically 
did not differ. Anxiety had an opposite effect, participants with highest anxiety levels 
solved fewer problems with insight than participants lowest on anxiety; thus, anxiety was 
negatively correlated with solving problems via insight. However, anxiety did not affect 
the raw number of analytical solutions obtained. These findings fall in line with 
suggestions made by Abele (1992) that "intuitive" problems benefit from positive affect, 
but not analytical problems. The results of this study also serve to explain why meta-
analytical studies (Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; Davis, 2009) found no reliable effect 
of mood on insight problems. While mood affects what strategy a person may use to 
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solve an insight problem, because different people might solve insight problems using 
different strategies; in the end, there will be no difference in the number of problems 
solved. This study also found that anxiety, activating negative affect, enhanced the 
proportion of solutions achieved analytically. This effect might also be contributed to a 
narrowing of attentional focus. 
Contrary to the results of other studies, Clapham's (2001) study found no 
evidence for mood effects on divergent thinking. In this study, mood was induced using a 
list of statements, each of which corresponded to a treatment condition. In the positive 
affect condition, the statements grow increasingly positive, ending with statements such 
as "This is great...I really do feel good. I am elated about things!" and "I'm full of 
energy!" (Clapham, p. 341). In the negative affect condition, the statements become 
increasingly negative, ending with expressions such as "All of the unhappiness of my 
past life is taking possession of me" and "1 want to go to sleep and never wake up" 
(Clapham, p. 341). The study used the TTCT-Figural (Torrance, 1966) as a measure of 
divergent thinking in which test takers were asked to use abstract sketches to form 
pictures. For example, test takers were asked to use a circle to draw whatever they 
choose. The study found that positive mood did not facilitate performance on divergent 
thinking measures. Conversely, negative mood was not found to impede performance, 
either. The authors speculated that the failure to find significant differences among 
treatment conditions may have been due to the fact that mood manipulation was too 
weak, particularly for the negative mood condition, to produce significant changes. 
Vosburg (1998a) examined the effects of positive and negative mood on 
divergent-thinking tasks. Mood and arousal were assessed at the beginning of experiment 
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using an adjective checklist. Divergent thinking was measured by tasks that asked 
participants to respond to various real-life scenarios, which measured two distinct 
components of divergent thinking: problem finding and problem solving. They found that 
overall positive mood was positively related, and negative mood was negatively related 
to the task performance for both problem finding and problem solving. No effect of 
arousal was detected. In another study using the same measures, Vosburg (1998b) tested 
a hypothesis that positive mood should foster the amount, but not the quality, of produced 
ideas. The hypothesis was supported, i.e., positive mood was significantly related to the 
quantity of ideas factor, encompassing fluency and flexibility components, but not to the 
quality of ideas factor, which measured originality and usefulness of produced ideas. 
In summary, while the prevailing view in mood-creativity research is that positive 
mood induces creativity uniformly across a wide variety of tasks (e.g., meta-analytical 
study by Baas, De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008), closer examination of the results of separate 
studies reveal a far more complicated pattern. Differing results of mood influence on 
creativity are obtained on different creativity measures. For example, results of mood 
influence on RAT task are contradictory, with not all studies showing a solid 
performance improvement (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). Additionally, other 
studies (Vosburg, 1998b) found that positive mood affects differentially various 
components of creativity. For example, it is related to the quantity, but not quality of 
produced ideas. The mood induction technique appears to matter as well, as not all 
induction procedures produce enough change in mood states to evoke significant change 
in creative thinking. Some methodological shortfalls of the aforementioned studies might 
also be responsible for their contradictory results, such as failure to include negative 
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mood condition within the experiment, limiting comparison to only positive and control 
groups (e.g., Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985), or weak mood induction 
techniques (Clapham, 2001). Overall, the general conclusion is that positive mood has a 
consistent effect of benefitting performance on tasks that require broad attentional focus, 
however, on tasks requiring narrow attentional focus the effects of positive mood are far 
less clear. 
Negative Emotions and Creativity 
Not all researchers are in agreement that positive emotions necessarily enhance 
creativity while negative emotions stifle it. Historical data suggests that many highly 
creative people suffered from depression as well as other mental disorders. Indeed, 
multiple studies found links between creativity and mental disorders, in particular bipolar 
disorder (e.g., Andreasen, 1987; Jamison, 1989; Richards, Kinney, Daniels, & Linkins, 
1992), hypomania (e.g., Jamison, Gerner, Hammen, & Padesky, 1980; Schuldberg, 
1990), depression (e.g., Slaby, 1992), and schizophrenia (e.g., Keefe & Magaro, 1980; 
Sass, 2001), thus suggesting that negative affect might be conducive to creative 
processes. 
Among other studies, a study by Akinola and Mendes (2008), [that in fact was 
excluded from the Baas, De Dreu and Nijstad (2008) meta-analysis, omission justified by 
asserting that Akinola and Mendes study was singular in its findings], found that higher 
artistic creativity was associated with negative moods more so than with positive moods. 
The researchers used the Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults as a base line measure of 
creativity. Each participant was asked to make "interesting" and "unusual" pictures using 
nine triangles. Mood was then manipulated using social approval/rejection task, in which 
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participants received either positive or negative feedback. During their second creativity 
task participants were asked to make an artistic collage using a piece of cardboard, a 
bottle of glue, a bottle of glitter, and pieces of felt and paper of various shapes and size. 
The participants' creativity was then assessed by experienced artists. Collages created by 
participants in the social rejection condition were judged as being the most creative, with 
ratings differing significantly from the control and social approval conditions. 
Interestingly, ratings in the social approval condition were even lower than those in the 
control condition, although this difference did not reach statistical significance. 
Kaufmann and Vosburg's (1997) research examined the effect of positive and 
negative moods on creative and analytic problem solving performance. Their study found 
a negative relationship between positive mood and creative problem solving. They used 
two insight problems as a measure of creativity. The first problem was a Two String 
problem, in which the task was to tie two widely separated strings hanging from the 
ceiling. Since it was impossible to grasp both stings at the same time, the insight into the 
problem was to tie available tools to the strings, and then use a pendulum movement to 
grab a hold of both strings. The second insight problem dealt with figuring out the 
construction a solid rack from two sticks and a C-clamp. The correct solution involved 
wedging the sticks together and using the C-clamp as a peg. Analytical performance was 
measured with a standard word-analogy task, and yet another problem required the 
detection of a rule behind a numbering sequence. Mood was manipulated by showing 
participants a 10 minute, positive or negative video clip. The results showed that negative 
mood enhanced performance while positive mood led to significantly poorer performance 
on both creative problems. Analytic problem-solving performance was not affected by 
18 
different affective states. The study's findings that positive mood effects are detrimental 
to insight problem solving contradict sharply with most research in this domain. The 
findings particularly contradict with the Isen et al. (1987) study that used very similar 
task, but which found an exact opposite trend. 
Another Kaufmann and Vosburg study (2002) tested the hypothesis that positive 
and negative moods might have different effect on creative problem solving as a function 
of constraint on the solution space of a task. Contrary to their previous study, they found 
that on divergent thinking tasks positive mood enhanced performance overall; yet over 
time, positive affect caused a decline in creative problem-solving performance, while 
negative affect was associated with greater idea production later in the process. In their 
experiment, the authors used a mood induction technique developed by Martin et al. 
(1993). First, participants were shown video clips to induce either negative or positive 
emotions, followed by a video clip from the film Speed, which was intended to arouse 
the participants in order to enhance mood induction. No films were shown to the control 
group. Creativity was assessed using four measures of divergent thinking. One was a 
problem-finding task, where participants were asked to come up with possible scenarios 
that lead to a problem described in a vignette. The second task was a problem-solving 
task where participants had to list all the solutions to the problem in the same vignette. 
The third task was to list all possible uses for a shoe, and in the last task, participants 
were presented with an ambiguous visual figure and were asked to list all possibilities of 
what that figure might represent. The results indicated a crossed interaction between 
positive/negative mood, and early/late idea production. Positive mood led to better 
performance in the first minute of problem solving, however, performance in the positive 
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mood condition declined sharply after that, and at minute four participants in the positive 
mood condition were performing worse than participants in the negative and control 
group conditions. Thus, positive mood led to superior idea production initially, however, 
caused a decline in idea production during the later stages of performance. The flat 
association gradient that participants showed in the negative condition was similar to the 
gradient that Mednick (1962) characterized as indicative of creativity. On the other hand, 
participants in the positive mood condition showed a steep response gradient that 
Mednick associated with less creativity. 
Kaufman stated "[the above] findings are consistent with results showing positive 
mood to increase fluency in divergent thinking tasks" (Kaufman, 2003, p. 132). However, 
he added, the argument that positive mood uniformly improves performance on divergent 
thinking tasks cannot be applied to every instance, and he called for a more complex 
understanding of creativity. Because creativity is a multifaceted construct, different 
moods may affect various components of creativity differently. 
Jausovec's (1989) study analyzed whether positive emotions enhanced analogical 
transfer on insight problems. The study found that positive mood increased analogical 
problem solving on ill-defined problems, but that positive affect was detrimental to 
performance on well-defined problems. Creativity was measured with two types of 
problems: ill-defined and well-defined. Ill-defined problems required participants to 
relate information given by the problem to other areas of a knowledge base, thus 
requiring an expansion of their attention, thinking globally, and using a top-down 
information processing approach in order to successfully solve the problem. The study 
found that positive affect aided analogical transfer on these types of problems. Well-
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defined problems, on the other hand, required participants to focus their attention only on 
the information given by the problem, no search of other knowledge was required in 
order to solve the problem. The results indicated that in fact positive affect hurt 
analogical transfer on well-defined problems. 
Wayne and Runco (1994) examined the link between divergent thinking and 
suicide ideation. Suicide ideation was assessed by questionnaire in a sample of university 
students. Divergent thinking was assessed by asking participants to respond to scenarios 
of real-life problems, like late homework, or unplanned pregnancy. Responses were 
scored for fluency, flexibility and originality. The study found a significant relationship 
between divergent thinking and suicide ideation. In particular, suicide ideation was 
positively associated with problem generation fluency, but negatively associated with 
problem solving flexibility. Thus, suicide-prone participants showed a greater ability in 
finding problems, which has been shown to be an important component in the creative 
process (Nickerson, 1999). 
Adaman and Blaney (1995) investigated the effects of musical mood induction on 
creativity. Mood was induced by playing 20-minute audio-clips that were designed to 
induce elated, depressed or neutral moods, a technique developed by Pignatiello, Camp, 
and Rasar (1986). Creativity was measured with the subset of the Torrance Tests of 
Creative Thinking (TTCT; Torrance, 1966). The researchers hypothesized that 
participants in the elation mood condition would score higher on creativity measures than 
would participants in the neutral or depression condition. Contrary to expectations, both 
the elated and depressed groups scored significantly higher than the controls. The authors 
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speculated that intensity of feeling, or activation might have a stronger influence on 
creativity than hedonic tone. 
Gasper (2004) tested the hypothesis that sad moods inhibit generative thought 
through affecting an individual's ability to use accessible, old ideas, as well as novel 
ideas, and by restricting access to available material in a memory. In a series of three 
experiments, the author tested this hypothesis, using similar method. Mood was 
manipulated by asking participants to write about either a sad or happy life event. After 
completing a crossword puzzle designed to_prime the participants with a set of solutions 
for the generation task, they completed the generation task that asked them to come up 
with as many as possible examples of "things that fly" (Gasper, p. 218). Old ideas were 
operationalized as the primed words found within the crossword puzzle, while new ideas 
were operationalized as ideas that had not appeared in the crossword puzzle. Contrary to 
their prediction, mood did not influence the use of old solutions in the generative task. 
Participants in a sad mood, however, generated fewer new responses than did participants 
in the happy mood condition. This was taken as evidence that negative mood alters the 
use of novel information, but not the use of information already stored in the memory. 
Braverman (2005) investigated whether negative moods facilitate data driven 
information processing, and whether positive moods promote a top-down information 
processing approach, while decreasing attention to cognitive task. Mood manipulation 
involved showing the participants either sad or happy video clip. Then each participant 
was given the task of detecting covariation of facial features with different test scores. 
The results showed that participants in a sad mood detected a greater amount of correct 
covariation than did participants in a happy mood. This was taken as evidence of the 
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tendency of a sad mood to influence more comprehensive scrutinizing of information. A 
subsequent study also showed that motivation was responsible for differential covariation 
detection in happy versus sad participants. Negative mood increased participants' 
motivation to engage in a more thorough thinking process and pay closer attention to 
details, which in turn led to more frequent correct hits. Thus, the hypothesis that sad 
mood promotes focusing on a task and facilitates a data-driven information processing 
approach, while happy mood detracts attention from the task at hand, was supported. 
Andrews and Thomson (2009) proposed that negative emotional states serve a 
valuable adaptive function. Using depression as an example, the authors showed it to be a 
useful mechanism for the successful solving of complex problems. Depression makes 
people ruminate over their problems, compelling them to revisit and analyze each 
problem in excruciating detail. Analysis is a necessary step in problem solving, thus it is 
advantageous to spend time doing so. However, there are many life distractions that 
might redirect one's attention from problem analysis. Thus, the analytical rumination 
hypothesis proposes that depression facilitates problem analysis by minimizing 
distractions and sustaining analysis towards these problems. Since processing resources 
are limited, it is achieved by: allocating cognitive resources to problem solving, 
eliminating distractions by minimizing the appeal of problem-irrelevant activities; and 
initiating psychomotor changes that minimize the ability to engage in distracting 
activities. 
Gasper (2003) investigated the hypothesis that people in a negative mood adhere 
to data more so than do participants in a positive mood. The dependent variable in this 
study was a mental set task (Luchins, 1942), requiring participants to form a word from a 
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set of presented letters. Some of problems required a certain mental strategy to solve 
them successfully (e.g., by using every second letter from a lettering set the solution for 
GZOQAXT is GOAT), while others could be solved using a direct, more apparent 
strategy (e.g., the solution for FYROOMG is ROOM). After presenting the participants 
with a problem designed to break the established mental set, they were given problems 
that could be solved using either one of the two strategies. The results indicated that 
participants in the sad mood condition updated their approach to problem solving more 
often than did participants in the positive or neutral mood condition, thus showing that 
people in a sad mood adhered to data more so than did people in happy or neutral moods. 
Smith, Michael, and Hocevar (1990) examined the effects of test anxiety on 
creative thinking, predicting that it should interfere with divergent thinking. Anxiety was 
induced by urging participants, middle school children, to do their absolute best, 
emphasizing strict grading and the importance of correct responses, imposing a time 
limit, and announcing monetary rewards for the top performers. The three creativity 
measures in the study were: the verbal fluency test; the figural fluency measure; and the 
mathematical fluency measure, which was designed to access the divergent production of 
symbolic implications. The presence of anxiety did not result in lower verbal fluency and 
figural fluency measure scores. Contrary to expectation, figural fluency test scores were 
higher for the anxiety group than for the control group. This difference was only 
marginally significant for a two-tail test, but would have reached customary significance 
level for a one-tail test, assuming there was a-priory directional prediction. Anxiety 
produced lower scores on the mathematical fluency measure as compared to the control 
condition, however the difference was only significant for males, not for females. 
24 
In summary, contrary to the widely held belief that negative emotions hinder 
creativity, a more detailed examination of the literature revealed surprising results. First 
of all, there are practically no studies asserting that negative emotions cause a decrease in 
creativity. An exception was a singular experiment investigating mathematical fluency in 
which anxiety was found to have negative effect on creativity, however, this effect was 
significant only for males. More surprisingly, in some cases, negative emotions were 
related to an increase in creative thinking across a wide variety of tasks. In particular, 
negative mood was associated with better performance on tasks requiring top-down 
information processing, focused attention, and data elaboration. Some authors suggest 
that negative moods help performance through a narrowing of attentional focus on the 
task at hand. Negative emotions also seem to have a motivational influence on a person's 
performance by compelling them to pay greater attention to problem details, ignore 
distractions, and engage in sustained problem analysis. However, the effects of mood on 
creativity are fragile, and not always discernible in research. One reason for this might be 
that negative mood manipulations are frequently insufficient in strength in laboratory 
settings, due to the ethical concerns, among other reasons. Interestingly, some studies 
found that positive mood hinders creativity, rather than promoting it, as widespread belief 
suggests. 
Mood and Attention 
Early investigative work into the relationship between mood and attention 
established that high negative emotional arousal causes a narrowing of attention. 
Eastbrook (1959) speculated that negative affect high in avoidance motivation would 
narrow attentional focus (Easterbrook, 1959), moreover, later studies supported this 
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proposition. Baron, Moore and Sanders (1978) found that social stress, which can be 
conceptualized as a highly activating negative mood, also caused a narrowing of 
attentional focus. Wachtel (1968) found that participants who were threatened with 
electrical shock, and had no means of avoiding it, exhibited a longer reaction time to 
targets in the periphery of their visual field than did non-threatened participants, thus also 
showing a narrowing of attentional focus. The results of Fenske and Eastwood's (2003) 
experiment showed that participants exposed to facial expressions displaying negative 
emotions showed more constricted attention. 
Mendelsohn and Griswold (1967) investigated the effects of repression denial and 
anxiety on the use of incidental cues in problem solving. As predicted, high scores in 
repression denial were negatively related to the use of incidental cues. Participants with 
high repression denial scores used fewer cues than did participants with low repression 
denial scores, yet, there was no difference between participants with regards to the raw 
number of un-cued solutions. These results were more pronounced for males. Contrary 
to expectation, anxiety was related to cue utilization in a curvilinear fashion, again for 
males only, with those participants exhibiting the highest and lowest levels of anxiety 
using the most cues. A number of key points can be taken from this research. First, it is 
clear that different negative emotions affect perceptual attention differently. Second, the 
notion that negative emotions uniformly narrow attentional focus is put to question. 
Finally, the curvilinear relationship for the effects of anxiety points to the differential 
effects of arousal on attention. 
Chajut and Algom (2003) also found that stress improved attentional selectivity. 
In their study, stress was manipulated by assigning participants high difficulty tasks, 
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some of which were unsolvable, imposing time pressure, introducing ego-threat by 
stating that they would be able to compare their performance to normative standards, and 
by subjecting them to loud noise. Selective attention was assessed by measuring each 
participant's ability to filter out irrelevant stimuli in a Stroop task. Narrowing of attention 
was uniformly observed across various stress manipulations. 
Navon (1977) proposed that under normal circumstances we tend to perceive and 
process visual information in a top-down manner, or in his terminology, go from a global 
structuring to more-and-more detailed representation of stimuli. In other words, we 
dismantle the scene, rather than build it up; we go from global to local features. To test 
his hypothesis, Navon used a task in which participants judged clusters of geometrical 
figures as being similar or dissimilar to a target cluster. Matching figures based on their 
global shape, i.e., cluster shape as a whole, was considered an indication of global bias, 
while matching based on component shape, was an indication of local bias. This idea of 
broad-narrow, or global-local attention was also used in later research investigating the 
effects of mood on attention (e.g., Gasper and Clore, 2002; Fredrickson and Branigan, 
2005). 
Using Navon's figure task as one of their measures, Gasper and Clore (2002) 
investigated the effects of mood on global-local information processing. The results 
showed that participants in the negative mood condition were less likely than were the 
happy participants to match a figure based on its global features. In another experiment, 
participants in a sad mood condition were also less likely than their happy counterparts to 
rely on a global concept. 
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Similar findings were obtained in Fredrickson and Branigan's (2005) study. In 
this study, participants were initially shown either a positive, negative or neutral video 
clip. Then, their scope of attention was assessed using Navon's (1977) global-local visual 
processing task. The hypothesis that people who experience predominantly positive 
emotions will exhibit a broader scope of attention and will identify figures having greater 
global resemblance rather than local resemblance to a standard figure was supported: 
participants who viewed a positively charged film identified more global selections than 
did the participants who viewed a negatively charged film. 
Basso, Schefft, Ris, and Dember (1996) investigated the relationship between 
personality characteristics, mood, and the breadth of attention. Due to "differences 
between sexes in affective experience and neuropsychological performance, only men 
were studied" (Basso et al., p. 250). There was no mood manipulation in this study; 
participants were administered three questionnaires: a depression inventory, a measure of 
subjective well-being, and a life-satisfaction scale. Breadth of attention was measured 
using the Kimchi and Palmer local-global judgment task (1982). The results indicated 
that positive mood was positively related to global processing, and negatively related to 
local processing. Anxiety and depression, on the other hand were positively related to 
local processing and negatively to global processing. 
Bless, Clore, Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe and Wolk (1996) found that happy 
participants relied more on general knowledge structures than did participants in a sad 
mood. Mood was induced by either asking participants to write about a happy or sad life 
event, or by showing them a positively or negatively charged video. Following mood 
induction, participants listened to a story, and were then presented with items that were 
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either typical or atypical to the story. They were then asked to indicate whether the items 
were present within the story. The dependent variable was the participants' reliance on 
either general knowledge, or on the information presented within a story. Happy 
participants were more likely to judge a typical item as having been previously presented 
in a story than were sad participants, i.e., they relied more on their general knowledge 
than on information from within a story. This finding supports the proposition that happy 
moods aid on tasks requiring broad attention and top-down information processing. 
Hicks and King (2007) investigated whether breadth of attention plays a 
mediating or moderating role between mood and meaning in life. While no support was 
found for the researchers' hypothesis that scope of attention relates to focus in life, the 
researchers did find a positive relationship between positive mood and breadth of 
attention, thus, adding further support for the positive mood/scope of attention 
relationship. 
Gable and Harmon-Jones (2008, 2010) noted the existence of a far more complex 
relationship between mood and attentional focus. In the 2008 study, they found evidence 
that positive affect high in approach motivation reduced the breadth of attention. The 
authors argue that the reason for previous studies finding that positive mood broadens 
attentional focus is due to the fact these studies manipulated positive affect low in 
approach motivation. In four studies, participants consistently showed less global 
attentional focus after they were induced into a positive mood high in approach 
motivation. Similar to the results of previous studies, positive mood low in approach 
motivation increased global attentional focus. The authors explained these results in 
terms of an evolutionary perspective. Positive affect low in approach motivation implies 
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stability and comfort, which fosters a broadening of attention for play and exploration. 
Conversely, positive affect high in approach motivation implies desired goal pursuit, in 
which case, the narrowing of attention serves the function of shutting off irrelevant 
stimuli that might distract from achieving the main goal. 
In 2010 study, Gable and Harmon-Jones argue, that while negative affect high in 
motivational intensity narrows attentional focus, negative affect low in motivational 
intensity broadens the attentional span. They suggested the reason previous research 
found that negative affect narrows the scope of attention is due to the fact that only 
negative affect high in motivational intensity was investigated. In the first experiment of 
this study, mood was manipulated by showing participants color photographs that were 
meant to evoke either a sad mood (low motivational intensity) or a neutral mood; the 
photographs were selected from the International Affective Picture System (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). Scope of attention was measured using Navon's letters task 
(1977); the concept of which was similar to Navon's geometrical figure task. Different 
from the majority of other research, it was participants' response time, rather than the 
number of global-local selections that was used as a dependent measure. The results 
showed that reaction time between global and local targets was larger in the sad mood 
condition than in the neutral mood condition. Additionally, participants in the sad mood 
condition showed a slower response time to local targets, while reaction time to global 
targets was similar across all conditions. This was taken as evidence of sad photographs 
causing a broadening of attention. In a follow-on experiment, the effects of high-
motivation negative affect (disgust) were examined. Mood was manipulated by showing 
participants pictures that were collected from the internet and were intended to elicit 
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disgust. The dependent measure was identical to the previous experiment. Participants in 
the disgust condition responded faster to local targets than to global targets, thus showing 
a narrowing of attention. These results show that deactivating negative mood states high 
in avoidance (sadness), broaden attention, while activating negative moods high in 
avoidance (disgust), narrow attention. 
Studies examining the relationship between temperament, affect and attention 
found that introversion and extraversion correlated with the manner in which attention 
was directed towards positive or negative cues. Derryberry's research (1987) revealed the 
phenomenon that introverts pay greater attention to negative cues than do extraverts. In a 
consequent research, Derryberry and Reed (1994) reestablished that extraverts were slow 
to shift attention away from positive locations, whereas introverts were slow to shift from 
negative locations. The researchers also found that negative feedback amplified this 
effect. These findings bridge the results of research investigating the effects of short-
lasting moods on attention with the findings of more global affective states being 
associated with stable personality characteristics. 
In sum, there is agreement in literature that people under normal circumstances 
and while in a positive mood, will tend to process information in a top-down manner, rely 
on general knowledge structures and global concepts, and in short, possess broad 
attentional focus. Conversely, people in a negative mood tend to process information in a 
bottom-up manner, rely more so on problem relevant information than on general 
knowledge, and demonstrate local bias, in other words, show a narrowing of attentional 
focus. 
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Studies investigating affect associated with personality characteristics also found 
a similar relationship between mood and attention. For example, introversion, a trait 
usually associated with narrow attentional focus was found to correlate with attention to 
negative cues, while extraversion, a trait associated with habitually broad attentional 
focus, was found to correlate with attention to positive cues (Derryberry, 1987; 
Derryberry & Reed, 1994). It is conceivable, that the narrowing of attention phenomenon 
might only be applicable to instances of negative affect high in activation, and not to 
negative affect low in activation. Only one study to date showed this particular pattern 
(Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010). However, because the study design included only 
negative and neutral mood conditions and failed to include a positive mood condition 
(thus creating a design that disallows adequate between group comparison), finding of 
this study should be interpreted with caution. 
Theories of why attentional focus narrows under negative activating mood states 
(such as states associated with the "fight or flight" response), hold that attentional 
resources are limited, thus selectivity, or localization of attention serves the purpose of 
allocating limited resources to the most pressing task-at-hand in the most efficient 
manner. Since "survival" of an individual may depend on the solving of a stressor-related 
problem, narrowing of attention ensures that resources are not wasted on other tasks 
(Chajut & Algom, 2003). Broad attention and the global bias associated with positive and 
neutral moods also make sense from an evolutionary perspective. Positive moods elicit 
broad attention that facilitates exploration and experimentation (Fredrickson, 2000). 
While negative emotions and narrow attention take care of survival and problem solving, 
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positive emotions and broadened attention promote play and exploration, facilitating the 
growth of an individual. 
Attention and Creativity 
Attention is linked to creativity in several ways. First, well-known stereotypes 
portray creative people as absent minded, paying little attention to mundane issues, with 
their attention wandering in some "higher sphere" (N^cka, 1999). While stereotypes 
should not be taken as evidence of any sort, they might point to a consistent phenomenon 
in some cases. Second, creative scientists report similar changes in their attention during 
the creative process. With regards to insight, they describe their attention as "diffused" 
just prior to an insight, and as "scanning" once the insight has been achieved (Ghiselin, 
Rompel & Taylor, 1964). Last, multiple experimental studies have found evidence of a 
relationship between attention and creativity (e.g., N?cka, 1999; Mendelsohn, 1976; 
Kasof, 1997). While most researchers agree that a relationship between attention and 
creativity exists, the direction of this relationship has less consensus. Some researchers 
found that broad attention fosters creativity, while narrow attention impedes it, others 
have found an opposite trend, and yet others have found that both broad and narrow 
attention fosters creativity, however this relationship is task dependent. 
Mednick (1962) proposed that individual differences in the strength distribution 
of associative responses are responsible for individual differences in creativity. Mednick 
distinguished between individuals with steep and flat associative hierarchies. Individuals 
with steep associative hierarchy tend to be restricted to stereotypical responses, i.e., 
responses highest in associative strength. The associative strength of responses to stimuli 
for individuals with a flat associative hierarchy is more equally distributed, thus 
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increasing the probability of them producing a more remotely associated, and therefore 
less stereotypical, response. Mednick proposed that the steeper the hierarchy, the less 
likely an individual to acquire a creative solution. It is those that are more likely to 
produce less stereotypical responses who are going to be more creative: "It is among 
these more remote responses that the requisite elements and mediating terms for a 
creative solution will be lurking" (Mednick, 1962, p.223). Individual differences in 
associative strength of responses can be viewed as differences in breadth of conceptual 
attention (Martindale, 1981, 1995; Friedman, Fishbach, Forster, & Werth, 2003), i.e., 
individuals with a steep associative hierarchy can be described as having a narrow scope 
of attention, and individuals with a flat associative hierarchy can be viewed as having a 
broad scope of attention. Thus, individuals with a broad scope of attention will tend to 
produce the least stereotypical, and therefore, most creative responses. 
Mendelsohn (1976) believed that a wide breadth of attention facilitates creative 
performance. He noted that "the greater the attention capacity, the more likely the 
combinatorial leap which is generally described as the hallmark of creativity" (p.366). He 
viewed attention as an important variable in studying creativity, a variable independent of 
intelligence. In a series of studies, Mendelson and his colleagues showed that a wide 
breadth of attention aided creative performance (Mendelsohn & Griswold, 1967; 
Mendelsohn, 1976; Mendelsohn & Lindholm, 1972). Mendelsohn and Griswold's (1967) 
study found that anxiety was negatively related to cue utilization, the results, however, 
generalized only to males. Repression denial scores were also negatively related to cue 
utilization, once again, the relationship was stronger for males. Mendelsohn and 
Lindholm's (1972) study showed that breadth of attention affected priming. In 
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Mendelsohn's (1976) study, the relationship between attentional capacity and Remote 
Associates Test (RAT) scores were examined. The findings supported his proposition 
indicating that participants with higher attentional capacity would score higher on the 
RAT. The author hypothesized that the results were due to the ability of participants with 
high attentional capacity to maintain several search strategies simultaneously. However, 
similar to the previous study, this finding generalized only to the male participants. 
N^cka (1999) found that creativity was associated with impaired functioning of 
the filter of attention. In his study, participants scoring high on divergent thinking 
measures had longer reaction time on attention tasks than did participants scoring low on 
divergent thinking measures, particularly when task complexity increased. In the 
attention task, participants were asked to identify letters identical to the target letter and 
ignore all others. Creativity was measured using two tasks: Test for Creative Thinking-
Drawing Production (TCT-DP) and Thinking Styles Questionnaire (TSQ). TCT-DP 
required participants to complete an unfinished picture. TSQ is a self-report measure 
consisting of items measuring ten scales that the author thought to be associated with 
creativity: (1) ego strength, (2) flexibility, (3) nonconformity, (4) spontaneity, (5) 
tolerance to incongruity, (6) internal locus of control, (7) intrinsic cognitive motivation, 
(8) esthetic attitude, (9) originality, and (10) self-actualization. The results showed that 
participants who scored higher on the creativity measure had poorer attentional 
functioning indices, i.e., had weaker filter of attention than did less creative participants. 
N^cka explained the confusing results of selective attention impairment in creative 
individuals by noting "the lack of a strong and efficient filter of attention may make a 
person susceptible to "irrelevant" stimuli which are normally ignored or suppressed" 
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(N^cka, p. 94). In terms of broad/narrow attention, filter of attention, that gives the ability 
to filter information, implies narrowing of attention. Thus, participants who had broader 
attention had better divergent thinking scores, yet, their ability to filter out irrelevant 
stimuli was reduced. The results also showed that creative individuals' performance 
deteriorated with time, particularly for individuals who scored high on intrinsic 
motivation. These findings mirror the findings of Kaufmann and Vosburg (2002) who 
likewise found a deterioration of idea production in participants within the positive mood 
condition, a state associated with broader attention. 
Kasof (1997) found that breadth of attention was positively correlated with 
creative performance. Breadth of attention was assessed by the Stimulus Screening Scale, 
which measures "individual differences in the tendencies to automatically filter irrelevant 
or extraneous stimuli from awareness and to habituate to salient stimuli (Kasof, p.306)". 
Narrowing of attention was induced by exposing the participants to loud noise. Creativity 
was assessed by asking participants to write two semi-structured poems. Creativity was 
found to correlate positively with breadth of attention. Creative performance was 
impaired by noise; in particular, noise impaired the creative performance of participants 
with a wide base-line breadth of attention more so than in those participants having a 
narrow breadth of attention. 
Friedman, Fishbach, Forster, and Werth (2003) found that situationally induced 
broad attention was related to better performance on divergent thinking tasks. In their 
study, scope of attention was primed by asking participants to conduct a visual search in 
either a broad or narrow area of a visual field. Two different tasks were used: one 
involved identifying the correct digits on a visual display, and the other asked participants 
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to concentrate on either a broad or narrow area of a map. Originality, one of the 
components of creativity, was assessed in three ways. The first task required participants 
to produce as many creative alternative uses for a brick as possible, the second task asked 
participants to create an original title for a photograph, and the third asked participants to 
provide the most unusual exemplar to a provided category (e.g., "birds", "colors", etc.). 
Results were consistent across all manipulation conditions and all tasks: participants in 
the broad attention condition showed greater originality than those participants in the 
narrow attention condition. In their final experiment the authors tested the hypothesis of 
whether simply manipulating the body muscles associated with broad or narrow 
attentional focus would likewise affect creativity in the same manner. They indeed found 
that when participants were asked to contract the muscles associated with broad attention 
(frontalis muscles), they produced more original uses for a pair of scissors, than did the 
participants who were asked to contract muscles associated with narrow attention 
(orrugators muscles). Thus, the study showed support for the ease of situational changes 
in the scope of attention, and correspondingly, creativity itself. 
In a six-month longitudinal study of sports creativity, Memmert (2007) examined 
long-term changes in creativity associated with attentional scope. After completion of a 
six-month training program, creativity was measured with tactical games that used real-
life sports scenarios. These narrow and broad attention programs improved different 
aspects of creative sport performance: broad attentional programs improved complex task 
performance, while narrow attentional programs improved simple task performance. 
In sum, research shows overwhelming support for the connection between the 
broad scope of attention and higher divergent thinking scores, particularly when 
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measured as the number of divergent ideas produced and the originality of ideas. It was 
proposed that creative people have easier access to remote associates in the semantic 
network. It was also shown that creative people have impaired filter of attention, which is 
responsible for information filtering. However, individuals with broad attentional focus 
tire out faster on idea production than do people with narrower attentional focus. While 
broad attention training programs improved complex task performance, narrow attention 
training improved simple task performance, thus raising the question whether narrow 
attention might be beneficial during some stages of the creative process. Finally, there are 
no studies to date investigating how other components of creativity are affected by 
narrowing of attentional focus, and whether they too might realize a benefit. 
Resolving the Controversy: Stage Model of Creativity 
Despite the almost rule of law postulate throughout the field of creativity that 
positive emotions uniformly and undeniably facilitate creative problem solving 
(Kaufman, 2003), a multitude of evidence contradicting this claim has been uncovered. 
Not only have negative emotions been found to promote creativity, but evidence suggests 
that positive emotions hinder creative processes on some occasions. While historical 
research profiling prominent creators have always noted a link between negative 
emotions and creativity, little of that notion has found its way into experimental research. 
Surprisingly, however, while meta-analyses investigating the link between emotions and 
creativity have been only finding positive relationship between positive emotions and 
creativity, and no or negative relationship between negative emotions and creativity, 
multiple separate studies have, in fact, found that negative emotions can promote 
creativity while positive emotions may stifle it. Why then such a discrepancy in research 
findings? Two reasons are investigated in this paper are: (1) the mediating effect of 
attention on the mood-creativity relationship; and (2) the multidimensional nature of 
mood and the creativity constructs, with different dimensions of each having different 
correlates (Figure 1). 












Figure 1. Stage model of the relationship between mood, attention and creativity. 
There appears to be two ways in which emotions affect creativity, one is through 
affecting motivation to engage in a task, and the second, through affecting cognitive 
processing, in particular through affecting attentional focus. Creativity, on the other hand, 
is a multifaceted, multistage process, with different correlates associated with different 
stages, yet, in laboratory studies it is broken down into its basic components. While such 
breakdown allows researchers to study creativity experimentally, it does not effectively 
reproduce all the interactions which occur in the real-life creative process. 
Helmholtz (1896) and Wallas (1926) originally suggested that the creative process 
can be divided into the following four stages: preparation, incubation, illumination or 
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inspiration, and verification or elaboration. Rathunde (2000) proposed that these four 
stages can be more broadly grouped into two stages: preparation and illumination. 
Similarly, insight problem research delineates at least two distinct stages in achieving an 
insight: the first stage is generative, associated with a search through the mental 
representation space, and the second is associated with finding a solution based on a 
formed representation (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992). The first step in the creative 
process, during which incubation and preparation occur, is associated with defocused, 
broad attention. This stage is characterized by divergent thinking, conceptually driven 
processing, a search for novel and unorthodox ideas, and new ways of problem 
representation. The second step in the creative process is characterized by focused, 
narrow attention and is associated with illumination and verification. This stage is 
characterized by data driven information processing and convergent thinking. In the 
creative process these two stages alternate in a circular, or more accurately, spiral 
manner, as a person works through the problem seeking the most optimal solution. Thus, 
while during the first stage of the creative process, positive emotions may aid in 
acquiring a broader perspective and an accumulation of information, during the second 
stage, negative emotions might be as beneficial in the narrowing of one's attention in 
order to achieve higher concentration on the task at hand (Rathunde, 2000). 
These two stages work in opposition to one another, going through multiple 
iterations during the creative process. Broadening of attention is associated with an 
exploration stage, when fresh ideas are brought into awareness, attentional focus is 
broadened to encompass new possibilities, remote, and seemingly unrelated ideas; in 
short, this stage is most traditionally linked to creativity in most research. During the 
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other stage, which is associated with narrowing of attention, new ideas that were brought 
to attention during the previous stage are scrutinized and strictly analyzed, unworthy 
ideas are discarded, while worthy ideas are retained. If no solution is found, the process 
repeats itself until a satisfactory solution is achieved or the individual gives up. It is worth 
noting, that these two stages are quite contrasting in terms of their correlates, and many 
correlates having a positive relationship with one stage, will have negative relationship 
with the other stage. For example, the first stage is associated with a higher number of 
ideas produced, while the second stage is associated with better quality of ideas, 
originality, and restructuring of mental representations (Kaufmann, 2003a, 2003b; 
Vosburg & Kaufmann, 1998). Likewise, analytical data scrutinizing and data-driven 
processing are crucial for the second stage, however, these processes would be 
detrimental during the first stage, when unusual and unorthodox ideas are important. 
More recently, later cognitive models of insight problem solving expanded the 
initial two stages proposed by earlier researchers. Ash and Wiley (2006) elaborated on 
earlier models of the insight problem solving by adding stages to these models (see 
Figure 2). First stage is problem representation, during which the solver forms an initial 
problem representation. However, in the case of insight problems, prior experience often 
leads to an incorrect representation of a problem, which in turn fails to yield a correct 
solution. Next, is the solution phase. As the initial representation was faulty the solver is 
unable to solve the problem and arrives at impasse, the point where no further progress is 
possible based on the initially formed representation. At this point the solver either gives 
up any further attempt to solve the problem, or progresses to the restructuring phase. 
During the restructuring phase, the solver revisits the initial representation and makes 
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adjustments, thus forming a new representation of the problem. If the new representation 
of the problem is correct, the solver successfully solves the problem, if not, the solver 
either gives up, or one again moves back into the restructuring phase and repeats the 





Solution Phase Restructurina 
Failure 
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Figure 2. The stages of insight problem solving (Ash and Wiley, 2006, p. 69). 
As with the two-stage model, certain predictions can be made regarding how 
attentional breadth affects different stages of the Ash and Wiley (2006) model of the 
insight problem solving process. Broad attention helps during the representation and 
restructuring phases by bringing in more divergent and "unlikely" ideas that diverge from 
the original, faulty representation. This can be achieved by activating distant nodes in the 
semantic network of long-term memory. Narrow attention helps to choose an idea from 
the multiple ideas that come up, analyze the idea for its potential usefulness, and work it 
to a solution; in other words it helps to zoom in on one potential solution among many. 
Without such controlled concentration, even if the right idea presents itself, it may be 
discarded prior to being properly analyzed. 
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An overview of studies investigating the relationship between emotions, attention 
and creativity suggests that looking at emotions as a single positive-negative dimension is 
oversimplified, and is not representative of all the complexities within the construct. At 
least two dimensions need to be taken into account when investigating emotional 
phenomenon with regards to creativity: hedonic tone and arousal. Throughout various 
stages of the creative process, these dimensions correlate differently with the creative 
performance. The vast majority of studies analyzing the relationship between emotions, 
attention and creativity investigate hedonic tone as predictor of creativity. However, 
when only positive and negative affect are used as predictors of attention and creativity, 
study results often contradict each other. With the added dimension of high and low 
arousal, differential predictions appear for different alignments of dimensions. For 
example, investigation of the activating/deactivating mood axis showed a broadening of 
attention for both positive and negative deactivating moods (Isen & Daubman, 1984). 
This differential influence of various mood dimensions on attention allows us to explain 
the contradictory findings of mood on creativity. If attention stands as a mediating 
variable between mood and creativity, differential effects of mood on attention will in 
turn affect differently various components of creativity. 
Hypotheses 
Positive emotions have been shown to broaden and negative emotions to narrow 
attentional focus. However, some research suggests that the effects of mood valence on 
different tasks are conditional on activation or arousal. Thus, the prediction is that 
mood's effect on attention will interact with arousal. 
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Hypothesis 1: Effects of mood on attention will be dependent on activation, i.e., 
there will be an interaction between mood and arousal. 
There is well-established research showing a relationship between mood and 
creative task performance. However, the direction of this relationship is controversial. 
Some research finds that positive mood has a positive influence on creative performance, 
while negative mood has a negative influence. Other research suggests just the opposite, 
positive mood having a negative relationship with creativity, while negative mood having 
a positive relationship with creativity. Based on the multi-stage creativity model, the 
prediction is that whether or not mood enhances creativity depends on the type of creative 
task, and further, that the relationship between mood and creative task performance will 
also be dependent on arousal. 
Hypothesis 2: On creative tasks that require broad attention for successful 
performance, mood condition associated with broad attention will enhance performance, 
while mood condition associated with narrow attention will have a detrimental effect on 
performance. 
Hypothesis 3: On creative tasks that require narrow attention for their successful 
completion, mood associated with narrow attention will have an enhancing effect on 
performance, while mood associated with broad attention will be detrimental. 
Hypothesis 4: There will be a three-way interaction between mood, arousal, and 
problem type. 
On insight problems, broad attention will promote a higher solution rate on 
problems that require multiple restructurings, while narrow attention will lead to a higher 
solution rate on single restructuring problems. 
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Hypothesis 5: Participants in the broad attention condition will solve more two 
restructuring problems than will participants in the narrow attention condition. 
Hypothesis 6: Participants in the narrow attention condition will solve more one 
restructuring problems than will participants in the broad attention condition. 
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Based on the findings of the previous experiments, power analysis was conducted 
to determine the sample size necessary to detect an effect, if such existed. Gable and 
Harmon-Jones (2010) reported effect sizes from two experiments, both of which used 
photographs selected from the International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2005). The experiments investigated the effects of emotional sates on the 
breadth of attention. Gable and Harmon-Jones used adapted Navon's (1977) attentional 
breadth measure, similar to the measure used in the current experiment. One of these 
studies compared how sad picture condition (negative affect low in arousal) versus 
neutral condition affects attentional breadth. The associated effect size was tj2 = .12. For 
this effect size, using a = .05, and 80% power, as recommended by Cohen (1992), the 
necessary number of participants per group is n = 30. Thus, the total number of 
participants for the five conditions of this experiment (positive low arousal, positive high 
arousal, negative low arousal, negative high arousal, and neutral) had to be at least N = 
150. 
Two hundred seventy Old Dominion University undergraduate students were 
recruited to participate in this study. The participants were required to be at least 18 years 
of age in order to participate. The mean age of the participant was M - 20.3, SD = 3.15, 
with minimum age of 18 and maximum age of 43 years old. There were 174 females and 
96 males in this study. Students signed up for the experiment using the university's 
computerized research system, and they received one point of departmental research 
credit for their participation. Application for exempt human subject research was 
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submitted to Old Dominion University's Institutional Review Board and was found to be 
exempt from IRB review. Ethical guidelines as set forth by the American Psychological 
Association were followed, and all participants were required to sign a volunteer rights 
notification form. 
Positive Mood Low Arousal Negative Mood Low Arousal 
Negative Mood High Arousal Positive Mood High Arousal 
Figure 3. International Affective Picture System samples. 
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Materials 
In this study, emotions were induced by using the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS). The IAPS has been developed by the National Institute of Mental Health 
(NIMH) Center for Emotion and Attention (CSEA) at the University of Florida as a tool 
for investigating emotion and attention. The IAPS (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) is a 
set of standardized, emotion-inducing color photographs representing a wide range of 
semantic categories. The IAPS has three major dimensions of emotion: two of these 
primary dimensions are valence of affect (ranging from positive to negative), and arousal 
(ranging from calm to aroused). The third is a "dominance" or "control" dimension. (For 
examples of IAPS images see Figure 3). 
Attention was measured using two instruments: Navon's (1977) global-local 
processing task and the Stroop task. Navon's geometrical figure task (Figure 4) uses 
global-local visual processing paradigms to measure a predisposition towards broad or 
narrow attentional focus. In this task, participants are given a target figure, which they 
then compare with two comparison figures. One comparison figure resembles the target 
figure in global features, while the other is similar to the target figure in detailed, or local 
elements. Matching figures based on their global shape, i.e., cluster shape as a whole, is 
considered an indication of global bias, while matching based on component shape, is an 
indication of local bias. This task is commonly used in research investigating broad-local 
attentional biases (e.g., Gasper and Clore, 2002; Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005). The 
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) is a classic attentional selectivity test. In this task, the names 
of colors printed in various colored fonts are presented, and the participant's task is to 
identify font color while ignoring the printed word. Herein, there are two types of stimuli: 
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congruent and incongruent. The congruent stimuli have matching word meaning and font 
color, while the incongruent stimuli have conflicting word meaning and font color. The 
difference in reaction time between congruent and incongruent stimuli indicates the 
Stroop effect. Stroop effect indicates poor functioning of selective attention, thus shorter 
reaction time indicates better selective attention, and should relate to a narrowing of 
attentional focus. Conversely, longer reaction time indicates poorer functioning of 
selective attention, and should relate to a broader attentional focus. 
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Figure 4. Examples of global-local items. 
Creativity was measured using two types of problems: insight problems (problems 
with only one correct answer), and open-ended problems (problems having multiple 
correct answers or no single answer defined as being "correct"). For both types of 
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problems there are two subtypes, each requiring either a broad or narrow attentional 
focus. 
Insight Problems. Two types of insight problems were used: rebus puzzles and 
matchstick problems. 
Rebus puzzles (Figure 5) are widely used throughout insight problem research. A 
rebus puzzle typically requires the solver to come up with a common phrase based on 
verbal or visual cues hidden within the presented material (MacGregor & Cunningham, 
2009). For example, the solution to "PUNISHMENT" is capital punishment, which 
requires the solver to attend and explicitly interpret the font characteristics of the 
presented word. A rebus puzzle may require more than one such restructuring, e.g., to 
come up with a solution for "amUous", the solver must first, interpret the capitalized 
letter as "big", and second, interpret the (big) letter as being part of the word. Hence, 
amUous can be interpreted as ambiguous. As the number of restructurings increase, so 
does the difficulty of the puzzle. A puzzle's difficulty also increases as restructuring 
moves from the supra-word level (relationship between words) to the sub-word level 
(interpretation of the characteristics of the word). Four types of rebus puzzles were used: 
sub-word with one restructuring, sub-word with two restructurings, supra-word with one 
restructuring, and supra-word with two restructurings. Broad attention should be related 
to better solution rates on problems with multiple restructurings, as it will expand the 
solver's solution space, and allow a search for more possible answers after initial impasse 
is overcome. Alternatively, narrow attention will promote higher solution rates on 
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Figure 5. Rebus puzzles. 
Two types of matchstick problems were used: matchstick arithmetic and 
geometrical figures. Matchstick arithmetic problems are often used in cognitive research 
(Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999). These types of problems present a false 
arithmetic statement written in Roman numerals. The directions to the problem allow for 
the moving of just one matchstick in order to solve the problem. The primary challenge in 
these types of problems comes from the difficulty in decomposing chunks of the problem 
as perceived by the solver (such as a plus sign or numerals such as X, V, etc.). An 
example of such a problem would be: 
XI = 111 + 111 
In order to solve the problem, the solver has to slide one matchstick in numeral X to 
transform it into the numeral V, which provides the solution: 
VI = III + III 
52 
Yet another insight problem, the Squares, requires the solver to go beyond the 
current problem representation in order to solve. In this problem the solver is given 
directions to move three matchsticks to make five squares from the original three. 
JlL U U 
The only possible solution is creating four small squares enclosed by a larger square. 
CO LU 
The difficulty of this problem lies in recognizing that the larger figure consisting 
of four smaller squares creates the fifth square. 
Open-Ended Problems. There were two types of open-ended problems used: 
problems requiring the production of multiple divergent ideas [Unusual Uses (UU)] and 
problems requiring extrapolation from a given situation to a different situation 
[Consequences(C)]. Both problem types were adapted from the Minnesota Tests of 
Creative Thinking which were developed based on Guilford's and colleagues' materials 
(Guilford, Wilson, Christensen, & Lewis, 1951). The Unusual Uses problem is 
commonly used as a divergent thinking measure in creativity research assessing fluency 
and the originality of ideas (Smith, Michael, & Hocevar, 1990) and is a direct 
modification of the Guilford Brick Uses Test. In this type of problem, participants are 
instructed to write as many answers to a question as quickly as they can, e.g., "List as 
many as possible uses for a shoe". 
The Consequences task has been used in research investigating emotions and 
attention (e.g., Abele, 1992). The Consequences task measures the logical extrapolation 
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of experiences applied to an impossible situation. In this task, participants were instructed 
to produce as many ideas as possible for the fictitious situation of "what would happen if 
one were able to listen to [another] person's secret thoughts (Abele, p. 207). This task is 
also scored for the fluency and originality of ideas. 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) was used as a manipulation 
check measure. PANAS (Appendix A), a twenty-item scale, is a highly reliable and valid 
measure of positive and negative affect. Using it, participants indicate, on a 1-5 scale, to 
what extend they experience the following twenty emotions: interested, distressed, 
excited, upset, strong, guilty, scared, hostile, enthusiastic, proud, irritable, alert, ashamed, 
inspired, nervous, determined, attentive, jittery, active, and afraid (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). 
Procedure 
Each participant registered for the study using the university's computerized 
research system. This was an on-site study with the participants attending a one-hour 
session at a laboratory located on the Old Dominion University campus. Upon arrival, 
each participant was greeted by a researcher. The participants were informed of the 
study's purpose and signed a volunteer rights notification form prior to the experiment. A 
research assistant then read a welcome script to the participants and provided them with 
instructions for the experiment. Participants used a laboratory personal computer (PC) to 
complete the experiment. The measures' presentation order was randomized across the 
participants. Each participant was debriefed at the end of each session. Experiment 
protocol was created using E-Prime experimental programming software. 
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Each experiment session started with the participants reading the directions for 
the first task. Next, the participants were presented with stimuli blocks: global/local 
attention measure, Stroop task, rebus puzzles, matchstick problems, and Unusual Uses 
and Consequences open-ended problems. Stimuli blocks' order of presentation was 
randomized across the participants. Each block was preceded by a set of directions, 
followed by two practice trials. For the global/local attention measure, Stroop task, and 
rebus puzzles, participants were presented with an emotion-eliciting picture for six 
seconds before each trial. Thus, participants were being continuously induced with 
emotion-eliciting pictures throughout trials. For the tasks that required longer time for 
their completion, such as matchsticks problems (4 min.) and open-ended problems (2 
min.), participants viewed a block of emotion-eliciting pictures for 30 seconds prior to 
each task. Presentation of pictures was randomized across trials and tasks, thus each 
participant within the same emotion/arousal condition viewed pictures in the different 
order. After completing all the blocks, the participants were asked to complete the 
PANAS scale, as a manipulation check. At the end, all participants viewed six minutes of 
low arousal positive pictures and were debriefed by the researcher to ensure that any 
possible effects of negative induction did not linger. 
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RESULTS 
For a summary of analyses performed and associated variables please see Table 1. 
Manipulation Check. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) was 
used as a manipulation check measure. 
Positive Affect. The between-subject ANOVA for positive affect (PA) scores 
showed a significant difference between three conditions (positive, negative and neutral), 
F (2, 269) = 21.59, p < .001, partial rj2 = .138. Post-doc comparisons using Sheffe's 
Alpha correction showed a significant difference between negative and neutral 
conditions, 95% CI [.86,6.13],/? < .01; negative and positive conditions, 95% CI [-6.03, 
-1.20],/? < .01; and between neutral and positive conditions, 95% CI [.03, 5.1 1],/? < .05. 
Negative Affect. The between-subject ANOVA for negative affect (NA) scores 
showed there was a significant difference between three conditions (positive, negative 
and neutral), F(2, 267) = 7.20,/? < .001, partial rj2 = .051. Post-doc comparisons using 
Sheffe's Alpha correction showed that there was a significant difference between positive 
and negative conditions, 95% CI [.45, 4.26], p < .01; and negative and neutral conditions, 
95% CI [-6.13, -.86],/? < .01. No significant difference was detected between neutral and 
positive conditions, 95% CI [-3.74, 1.45], p = .56. For the summary of means and 
standard errors for positive and negative affect, please see Table 2. 
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Table 2 





Positive 31.47 0.65 14.58 0.53 
Negative 25.28 0.69 16.93 0.56 
Neutral 28.90 1.12 13.44 0.91 
Stroop Task. Hypothesis 1 predicted that effects of mood on attention would be 
dependent on activation that is that there would be an interaction between mood and 
arousal. To test this hypothesis a 2(mood) x 2(arousal) x 2 (congruency) split-plot 
ANOVA was conducted on mean reaction time scores. Data were cleaned by bringing in 
the outliers to the closest non-outlier value, a technique called "winsorizing" (Duan, 
1 9 9 9 ) .  T h e r e  w a s  a  m a i n  e f f e c t  f o r  c o n g r u e n c y ,  F  ( 1 ,  2 3 4 )  =  3 2 5 . 3 0 ,  p  <  . 0 0 1 ,  p a r t i a l  r j 3  =  
.582, with the incongruent condition taking longer to respond than the congruent 
condition. There was also a congruency by valence by arousal interaction, F (1, 234) = 
4.10,p< .05, partial rj2 = .017. A follow-up 2-way interaction for the congruent condition 
was non-significant, F{ 1, 234) = .11, p = .381, partial rf = .003, while there was a main 
effect for valence, F (1, 234) = 6.01, p < .05, partial rf- .025, with the negative condition 
(M= 1032.50, SE - 19.41) taking longer to respond than the positive condition (M = 
966.87, SE = 18.45). Follow-up two-way interaction for the incongruent condition was 
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Figure 6. Mean reaction time (milliseconds) for the Stroop task as a function of valence, 
arousal, and congruency. 
Comparison of positive high to positive low was significant, F(l, 234) = 4.12, p 
< .05, partial r\2 = .017, with positive high taking longer to respond than positive low. 
Comparison of positive low to negative low was also significant, F (1, 234) = 4.96, p < 
.05 partial rj2 = .021, with the negative low condition being slower to respond than the 
p o s i t i v e  l o w  c o n d i t i o n .  T h e r e  w a s  a l s o  a  m a i n  b e t w e e n - s u b j e c t  e f f e c t  f o r  v a l e n c e ,  F  ( 1 ,  
2 3 4 )  =  3 . 7 3 ,  p  <  . 0 5 ,  p a r t i a l  t ] 2 =  . 0 1 6 ,  w i t h  t h e  n e g a t i v e  c o n d i t i o n  ( M =  1 0 8 8 . 5 0 ,  S E  =  
17.93) taking longer to respond in both congruent and incongruent conditions than the 
positive condition (M= 1040.73, SE = 17.04). Cohen's ds were also computed to 
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compare between congruent and incongruent conditions for each combination of 
mood/arousal induction condition (Figure 6). For the summary of means and standard 
errors for reaction time, please see Table 3. 
Table 3 





PL 942.41 24.82 1076.01 26.61 
PH 986.37 23.85 1155.13 25.57 
NL 1018.79 25.03 1161.18 26.84 
NH 1030.84 26.17 1143.20 28.05 
Total 995.35 13.39 1133.88 12.49 
As expected, Stroop effect was observed; participant response time increased 
when font color differed from word meaning over that when font color and word meaning 
were the same. Overall, in both font color and word meaning matching and non-matching 
conditions, participants in a negative mood condition took longer to respond than did 
participants in a positive mood condition. More interestingly, there was a different 
response pattern observed for congruent and incongruent conditions. When font color and 
word meaning matched, participants in a negative mood condition took longer to respond 
than did participants in a positive mood condition. When font color and word meaning 
did not match, participants in a positive mood high arousal and negative mood low 
arousal conditions took longer to respond than did participants in a positive mood low 
arousal condition. 
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Number of Global Responses. Hypothesis 1 predicted that effects of mood on 
attention would be dependent on activation that is that there would be an interaction 
between mood and arousal. Leven's test for homogeneity of variance for the number of 
global responses was significant, F (3, 184) = 3.29, p < .05. Checking for the skewness 
indicated that skewness was within normal range (.20). Also, no outliers were detected 
for the number of global responses variable. To correct for the violation of homogeneity 
of variance, the data was transformed using logarithmic transformation as recommended 
by Maxwell and Delaney (2004, p. 117). After this transformation, Leven's test was non­
significant, F(3, 184) = 2.29, p >.05. A 2 (valence) x 2 (arousal) between-subjects 
ANOVA for the log-transformed number of global responses detected a valence by 
arousal interaction, F( 1, 184) = 9.21, p < .001, partial tj2 = .048 (Figure 7). Contrast 
comparing positive low to negative low showed a significant difference between the two 
conditions, F(l, 184) = 5.37,p < .05, partial rj2 = .028. Comparison between positive 
h i g h  a n d  n e g a t i v e  h i g h  s h o w e d  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  c o n d i t i o n s ,  F  ( 1 ,  
184) = 3.96, p < .05, partial t]2 — .021. Comparison between a combined positive low and 
negative high to a combined positive high and negative low was significant, F(l, 184) = 
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Figure 7. Mean number of global selections as a function of valence and arousal. 
Table 4 
Means and Standard Errors for Number of Global Selections 
M SE 
PL 29.78 2.71 
PH 21.62 2.67 
NL 20.78 2.82 
NH 29.79 3.13 
These results confirmed the hypothesis that valence and arousal interact in 
influencing attentional breadth. Participants' attention in the positive emotion low arousal 
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and negative emotion high arousal condition was broader than that in the positive high 





Figure 8. Mean number of solutions for one restructuring Rebus puzzles as 
a function of valence and arousal. 
Rebus Puzzles. Hypothesis 5 predicted that participants in the broad attention 
condition will solve more two restructuring problems than will participants in the narrow 
attention condition. Hypothesis 6 predicted that participants in the narrow attention 
condition will solve more one restructuring problems than will participants in the broad 
attention condition. 
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A 2 (number of restructurings: 1 vs. 2) x 2(valence) x 2 (arousal) split-plot 
ANOVA was conducted for the number of problems solved. There was a main effect for 
the number of restructurings; more one restructuring problems were solved than were two 
restructuring problems, F( 1, 231) — 477.52, p < .001, partial r\2 = .674. There was also a 
number of restructurings by valence by arousal interaction, F( 1,231)= 16.08, p < .001, 







Figure 9. Mean number of solutions for two restructuring Rebus puzzles as 
a function of valence and arousal. 
The three-way interaction was followed up with two way valence by arousal 
interactions for one and two restructurings. Interaction for one restructuring was 
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significant, F  (1, 231) = 4.32, p  <  .05, partial r j 2  = .018. Interaction for two restructurings 
was also significant, F (1, 232) = 3.89, p < .05, partial rj2 = .016. Follow up comparison 
for one restructuring problems comparing positive high and negative low combined (M = 
5.21 ,SE = .22) to negative high and positive low combined (M= 4.74, SE = .23) was 
significant, F(l, 231) = 4.32, p < .05, partial tj2 = .018. A comparison of low positive to 
low negative conditions was marginally significant, F(l, 231) = 2.9,p = .09, partial tj2 = 
.012. Follow up comparison for two restructuring problems comparing positive high and 
negative low combined (A/= 2.55, SE - .19) to negative high and positive low combined 
(M= 2.92, SE = .19) was significant, F(l, 232) = 3.89,p < .05, partial tj2= .016. For the 
summary of means and standard errors please see Table 5. 
Table 5 
Means and Standard Errors for Number of Rebus Puzzles Solved 
One Restructuring Two Restructuring 
M SE M SE 
PL 4.71 .25 2.95 .18 
PH 5.16 .22 2.57 .19 
NL 5.25 .22 2.53 .19 
NH 4.76 .23 2.86 .20 
Total 4.98 .23 2.72 .19 
In summary, one restructuring problems were easier to solve than were two 
restructuring problems. Additionally, participants in the positive high and negative low 
conditions, conditions associated with more local attention, solved more one restructuring 
problems than did participants in the negative high and positive low conditions, condition 
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linked to more global attention. The pattern was reversed for the two restructuring 
problems, participants in the negative high and positive low condition, which is 
associated with more global attention, solved more two restructuring puzzles than did 
participant in the negative low and positive high condition, a condition associated with 
more local attention. 
Fluency of Ideas for Unusual Uses (UU) and Consequences (C) Problems. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that there would be a three-way interaction between mood, 
arousal, and problem type. The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) between two 
coders for the number of ideas produced was .99 for both types of problems (UU and C). 
A 2 (problem type) x 2(valence) x 2 (arousal) split-plot ANOVA was conducted for the 
number of ideas produced for Unusual Uses (UU) and Consequences (C) problems. 
There was a within-subjects main effect for problem type, with participants producing 
significantly more ideas for UU problem (M = 6.81, SE = .20), than for C problem (M = 
2.41, SE - .09), F (1, 229) = 449.21, p < .001, partial if = .662. There was also a valence 
by arousal between-subject interaction, F (1, 229) = 7.15,/? < .01, partial r/3 = .030 
(Figures 10 & 11). Follow-up comparisons showed that there was a significant difference 
comparing negative high and positive low combined (M = 4.92, SE = .24) to positive high 
and negative low combined (M= 4.29, SE = .23) collapsing across both types of 
problems, F{ 1, 229) = 7.15,/? < .01, partial t]2 = .030. There was also significant 
difference between negative low (M= 4.08, SE - .24) and negative high (M = 4.97, SE = 
.25), F(l, 229) = 6.74,/? < .01, partial rf = .029, and positive low (M = 4.87, SE= .24) 
and negative low (M = 4.08, SE= .24), F(l, 229) = 5.60,/? < .05, partial tj2= .024, also 
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Figure 11. Mean number of ideas produced for Consequences (C) problem as 
a function of valence and arousal. 
In summary, participants with broader attention (negative high arousal and 
positive low arousal) showed higher fluency than did participants with narrow attention 
(negative low arousal and positive high arousal). 
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Originality for Unusual Uses (UU) and Consequences (C) Problems. Analysis 
of originality of ideas was performed to test hypotheses 2 and 3. Hypothesis 2 predicted 
that on creative tasks that require broad attention for successful performance, mood 
condition associated with broad attention would enhance performance, while mood 
condition associated with narrow attention would have a detrimental effect on 
performance. Also hypothesis 3 predicted that on creative tasks that require narrow 
attention for their successful completion, mood associated with narrow attention would 
have an enhancing effect on performance, while mood associated with broad attention 
would be detrimental. 
The ICC between two coders was 0.75 for the Unusual Uses (UU) problem and 
0.84 for the Consequences (C) problem. Coding responses were verified by a third coder, 
and the coding responses of the initial two coders were averaged for analyses. The task of 
the third coder was to make sure that there were no major discrepancies between the 
initial two coders. A 2 (problem type) x 2 (valence) x 2 (arousal) split-plot ANOVA was 
conducted for the originality of ideas produced for the UU and C problems. There was a 
main effect for problem type, F (1, 225) = 252.02, p < .001, partial tj2 = .528, with C 
problem responses being rated as significantly more original than UU problem responses. 
Additionally, there was a problem type by valence by arousal interaction, F (1, 225) = 
9.12,/? < .05, partial .039 (Figures 12 & 13). Three-way interaction effect was 
followed-up with a two-way interaction analyses for each problem separately. Two-way 
interaction for the UU problem was marginally significant, F (1,231) = 2.91,/? = .09, 
partial rj2 = .012. The comparison between positive low versus negative low was 
marginally significant, F(1,231) = 2.85,/? = .09, partial rj2= .012, with positive low 
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being rated as more original than negative low. Comparison of positive high and positive 
low was also marginally significant, F (1, 231) = 3.07, p - .08, partial rj2 = .01, with 






Figure 12. Mean originality ratings for the Unusual Uses (UU) problem as 
a function of valence and arousal. 
Two-way interaction for the C problem was significant, F{ 1, 225) = 9.97, p < .01, 
partial rj2 = .030. The comparison between positive high and negative high condition was 
significant, F (1, 225) = 4.02, p < .05, partial r\2 =.018, with positive high rated as more 
original than negative high. The comparison between positive low and negative low was 
marginally significant, F(l, 225) = 2.99,p =.08, partial r\2 = .013, with negative low 
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rated higher than the positive low condition. The comparison between positive high and 
low was marginally significant, F( 1, 225) = 3.16,/? =.08, partial t\2~ .014, with positive 
high rated higher than the positive low condition. For the summary of means and 






Figure 13. Mean originality ratings for the Consequences problem as 
a function of valence and arousal. 
In short, problem type, mood, and arousal interacted in determining how original 
the responses were. For Unusual Uses problem, the most original answers were given in 
the positive low and negative high conditions, which were associated with broad 
attention. For the Consequences problem, the most original responses were those 
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produced in conditions associated with narrow attentional breadth (positive high and 
negative low). 
Table 6 
Means and Standard Errors for Originality of Ideas for Unusual Uses and 
Consequences Problems 
Unusual Uses Consequences 
M SE M SE 
PL 4.51 .11 5.52 .12 
PH 4.23 .11 5.82 .12 
NL 4.24 .12 5.83 .13 
NH 4.35 .12 5.48 .12 
Total 4.34 .12 5.67 .12 
Usefulness of Ideas for Unusual Uses (UU) and Consequences (C) Problems. 
The ICC between two coders for the UU problem was 0.71 and 0.76 for the C problem. 
Coding responses were verified by a third coder, and the coding responses of the initial 
two coders were averaged for analyses. A 2 (problem type) x 2 (valence) x 2 (arousal) 
split-plot ANOVA was conducted for the usefulness of ideas produced for UU and C 
problems. There was main effect for problem type, F(l, 225) = 6.97,p < .01, partial r\2 = 
.030, with the C problem being rated as having significantly higher usefulness of 
responses (M = 5.35, SE = .16) than was the UU problem (M= 5.15, SE = .06). There 
was also a problem type by valence interaction, F (1, 225) = 9.56, p < .01, partial r\2 = 
.041, and problem type by arousal (marginal) interaction, F (1, 225) = 2.66, p < . 10, 





Figure 14. Mean usefulness ratings for the Unusual Uses (UU) problem as 
a function of valence and arousal. 
Bonferroni adjustment was made for the follow up comparisons, alpha level of .05 
was divided by the number of comparisons, thus leading to a new alpha level of .01. A 
follow-up comparison between the positive (M= 5.19, SE = .06) and negative (A/= 5.11, 
SE = .06) conditions for the UU problem was non-significant, F(l, 231) = 1.02,p = .315, 
partial tj- = .004. Comparison between the C problem positive and negative condition was 
significant, F(l, 225) = 7.01,/? < .01, partial rj2 - .030, with the negative condition (M = 
5.57, SE = . 12) rated as having higher usefulness than the positive condition (A/ = 5.15, 






non-significant, F (1,231) = .49, p = .49, partial t]2 = .002. Further, comparison between 
low and high arousal condition for the C problem was non-significant with alpha level 
correction, F(l, 225) = 3.95,p < .05, partial //'= .017. 
Valence 
Figure 15. Mean usefulness ratings for the Consequences problem as 
a function of valence and arousal. 
There was also between-subject main effects for valence, averaging across both 
types of problems, F(l, 225) = 3.72, p < .05, partial rj2 = .016, with negative condition 
responses (M- 5.34, SE = .07) being rated as having higher usefulness than positive 
condition responses (M =5.17, SE =.06); and main effect for arousal, averaging across 






condition (M - 5.35, SE = .06) having higher usefulness responses than the low arousal 
condition (M= 5.16, SE = .06). Problem type by valence by arousal interaction failed to 
reach significance. 
Overall, Consequences problem was rated as having higher usefulness of 
responses than was the Unusual Uses problem. Consequences task results indicated that a 
negative mood condition produced responses that were rated as significantly more useful 
than responses in the positive mood condition. For the Unusual Uses task there was a 
trend of positive mood condition responses being rated slightly higher than negative 
mood responses, however, this effect failed to reach significance. High arousal condition 
responses were rated overall as significantly more useful than were low arousal 
responses. 
Square and Matchstick Arithmetic Problems. Analysis of matchstick problems 
pertained to hypotheses 2 and 3. Hypothesis 2 predicted that on creative tasks that require 
broad attention for successful performance, mood condition associated with broad 
attention would enhance performance, while mood condition associated with narrow 
attention would have a detrimental effect on performance. Hypothesis 3 predicted that on 
creative tasks that require narrow attention for their successful completion, mood 
associated with narrow attention would have an enhancing effect on performance, while 
mood associated with broad attention would be detrimental. 
73 
Table 7 
Percent Solved for Squares and Matchsticks Problems 
Percent Solved 
Squares Matchsticks 
PL 19 25 
PH 22 22 
NL 25 24 
NH 17 18 
A 2 (valance) x 2 (arousal) logistic regression analyses were performed for the 
Matchstick Arithmetic and Squares problems. None of the effects of mood or arousal for 
these problems were significant. For the Matchstick Arithmetic problem the results of the 
tests were: main effect of valence x2 (1)= -03, p = .87; main effect of arousal (1) = .91, 
p = .34; and valence by arousal interaction (1) = .01 ,p = .98. For the Squares problem 
the results of the tests were: main effect of valence/^(l) = .18,/? = .67; main effect of 
arousal x2 0) = -25, p = .62; and valence by arousal interaction x2 (1) = -95, p = .33. For 
the summary of problems solved please see Table 7. 
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DISCUSSION 
Stage model of creativity predicted that effects of mood on attention would be 
dependent on activation. Global/local selections and Stroop tasks were hypothesized to be 
parallel measures of the breadth of attention, and were used to test these hypotheses. The 
results of the global/local task supported the predictions, while Stroop task did not yield 
the expected results. Stage model also predicted that type of the task would play a role in 
determining mood effects on creativity. In particular, the model predicted that on creative 
tasks that require broad attention, mood condition associated with broad attention will 
enhance performance, while mood condition associated with narrow attention will have a 
detrimental effect on performance. Furthermore, on creative tasks that require narrow 
attention, mood associated with narrow attention will have an enhancing effect on 
performance, while mood associated with broad attention will be detrimental. To test 
these predictions, the study used three types of tasks: rebus puzzles, open-ended 
problems, and insight matchstick problems. The results of the rebus puzzles supported the 
predictions. Fluency and originality measures of the open-ended problems also supported 
the model, while usefulness measure did not. The results of the insight problems did not 
support the predictions, either. Finally, manipulation check worked; participants in the 
positive mood condition reported feeling more positively than participants in two other 
conditions. Furthermore, participants in the negative mood condition reported feeling 
more negatively than participants in other conditions. 
Stoop Task. Stroop task results did not confirm the expectation that Stroop task 
would be an alternative measure of attentional breadth. Whereas some previous studies 
associated Stroop effect to attentional breadth (e.g., Chajut & Algom, 2003), this study 
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did not find support for such relation. While Stroop task is a widely used classic 
selectivity measure in psychological research, questions regarding Stroop effect's 
underlying mechanisms continue to receive investigative scrutiny. Originally, Stroop 
effect was explained by interference (competition between color and word meaning 
within incongruent trials) and facilitation (convergence of color and word meaning within 
congruent trials), which were assumed to be two sides of the same coin (e.g., Stroop, 
1935), and were traditionally used as a measure of selectivity of attention (MacLeod, 
1991). Based on this original view, global/local tasks such as Navon's letters or 
geometrical figures' task (Navon, 1977) can be viewed as being analogous to the Stroop 
task (MacLeod, 1991). Later investigations broadened the understanding of the Stroop 
effect by arguing that interference and facilitation were, in fact, two distinct mechanisms 
(MacLeod, 1998; MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000; Kane & Engle, 2003). Kane and Engle 
(2003) go on to argue that goal maintenance and competition resolution jointly determine 
Stroop task performance, while working memory (WM) capacity and a context-induced 
task set will determine which one of the two mechanisms will dominate. Individuals with 
high WM-span showed less interference than did low WM-span individuals across all 
variations of congruent/incongruent trials. Low-span individuals, on the other hand, 
committed more errors than did high-span individuals on rare incongruent trials, 
embedded within multiple congruent trials, thus displaying a deficient competition-
resolution mechanism. Based on this latter view, the Stroop task might be considered a 
poor measure of attentional breadth, which could explain the lack of correlation between 
the Stroop task findings and the global/local tasks findings within this study. 
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Global/Local Attention. The hypothesis that valence and arousal will interact in 
influencing the breadth of attention was confirmed. Positive emotions low on activation 
caused broadening of attention, which was consistent with the generally accepted view in 
the literature that positive emotions cause a broadening of attention (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 
2002; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). On the other hand, highly arousing positive 
emotions caused a narrowing of attention within this study. This finding was consistent 
with more recent research on mood and attention (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008) 
showing that positive mood high in approach motivation narrows attentional focus. Gable 
and Harmon-Jones suggested that the reason previous studies found that positive mood 
broadens attention is due to the fact that low activation positive mood induction was used 
within those earlier studies. In fact, review of the methodologies used by previous studies 
strongly supports such a view. 
In this study, negative mood low on arousal was found to narrow attentional 
breadth, a finding consistent with the majority of previous research (e.g., Baron, Moore & 
Sanders, 1978; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). Finding that 
negative mood low on arousal, a mood commonly associated with sadness and 
depression, narrows attentional breadth is also consistent with the analytical rumination 
hypothesis. Rumination hypothesis (Andrews & Thomson, 2009) suggests that sad and 
depressed people ruminate over their problems, thus narrowing their focus on problems 
for which they seek solution, and shutting off all other distractions. In evolutionary terms 
such a tactic is highly adaptive, since problem solving is an effortful activity requiring a 
great deal of cognitive resources; thus narrowing one's attention on a problem while 
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minimizing or ignoring everything else would help to use limited resources more 
effectively. 
On the other hand, highly arousing negative mood was found to broaden attention. 
This finding was completely new in light of previous research. Similar to previous 
research on positive emotions, it is conceivable that earlier studies used mood induction 
materials that were considerably lower on arousal than the manipulation materials used in 
this study. The current study used images in the highly arousing negative condition 
picked from the IAPS set of standardized pictures (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), 
that were exceptionally graphic in content and were rated as having extremely high 
arousal rating (M = 6.8 on a 1 to 9 scale). Also, a large body of the previous research 
used such induction materials as video clips and stories (for review, see Davis, 2009; 
Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008), which have significant time delay between the 
administration of the material and the dependent measure taken. During this lapse of 
time, transitory effects of arousal may dissipate, thus even when using measures that 
were thought to be highly activating, they may not have had the intended effect, or that 
effect may not have been accurately measured. Recently, however, with the rise of more 
sophisticated experimental software, well validated materials have been developed, such 
as the imagery used in this study that allowed for minimal time lapse, measured in the 
milliseconds, between picture presentation and the dependent measure of interest. 
One study of interest is Gable and Harmon-Jones's study (2010) asserting that 
negative affect high in motivational intensity narrows attentional focus, while negative 
affect low in motivational intensity broadens the attentional span; results that contradict 
our findings. While the above study used similar materials, such as IAPS pictures and the 
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Navon's letter task (1977), the latter being conceptually similar to the global/local figure 
task used by this study, the choice of their dependent variables is quite surprising. Instead 
of using a number of global/local selections, the authors instead chose to use reaction 
time to make selections, a choice that was motivated by the findings of their own 
previous study, and a choice even more oddly taken considering that no number of 
global/local selections, the traditional measure used for this type of task, were reported. 
The authors used slower reaction time to local targets as an indicator of a broadening of 
attention, and faster reaction time as evidence of a narrowing of attention; however, they 
do not expound a rationale for its use nor provide a theoretical explanation for it. 
The broadening of attention caused by a highly arousing negative emotional state 
makes sense from an evolutionary perspective; when faced with a potential "fight-or-
flight" situation caused perhaps by the sight of a predator, or potential foe, taking-in the 
entire picture all at once can be viewed as evolutionary adaptive, as it would aid in 
survival. Such a state of total awareness is known as zanshin in the martial arts (Morris, 
1992). Zanshin refers to having an awareness of one's surroundings, enemies, their 
weapons, and their next possible action all at the same time, while maintaining a state of 
alertness that enables quick reaction. Being in a state of broadened attention while being 
sufficiently aroused for quick response appears to relate to the zanshin concept. 
Rebus Puzzles. All else being equal, one restructuring problems were easier to 
solve than were two restructuring problems. This finding supported previous findings by 
MacGregor and Cunningham (2008, 2009), and Knoblich et al.'s (1999) prediction that 
problems containing more constraints would be more difficult to solve than problems 
having fewer constraints. Furthermore, participants in the positive high and negative low 
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conditions, conditions associated with narrow attentional breadth, solved more one 
restructuring problems than did participants in the negative high and positive low 
conditions, which are associated with broad attention. The pattern was reversed for the 
two restructuring problems, participants in the negative high and positive low condition, 
which is associated with broad attention, solved more two restructuring puzzles than did 
participant in the negative low and positive high condition, a condition associated with 
narrow attention (Figures 9 &10). Thus, for one restructuring problems, narrow attention 
led to more solutions, while for the two restructuring problems, broad attention facilitated 
a better solution rate, which supported the hypothesis of differential attentional breadth 
requirements during different stages of the creative process. The study's pattern of 
findings supports the idea that broad attention is related to the initial exploratory stage of 
the creative process, a time when multiple ideas are being considered as candidates for 
further exploration; while narrow attention is associated with the later stage of the 
creative process, a time when ideas receive greater attention and scrutiny, and are thus 
analyzed more closely. 
Fluency of Ideas for Unusual Uses (UU) and Consequences (C) Problems. 
Ideational fluency is a creativity measure originally developed by Guilford et al. (1951) 
that represents the number of ideas produced in response to a certain task. In this study, 
participants were asked to write down as many as possible uses for a shoe, and 
extrapolate what would happen if one were able to listen to [another] person's secret 
thoughts. If the hypothesis about differential attentional breadth requirements during 
different stages of the creative process is true, and if fluency of ideas is associated with 
the exploratory stage of the creative process, then broad attention should be related to 
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more ideas being produced. This relationship should not be dependent on a task, as broad 
attention should always be related to better fluency. This in fact, was the exact pattern of 
results in this study: participants with broader attention (negative high arousal and 
positive low arousal) showed higher fluency than did participants with narrow attention 
(negative low arousal and positive high arousal). 
Originality for Unusual Uses (UU) and Consequences (C) Problems. 
Originality may be considered the truest measure of creativity, as it represents how 
divergent ideas are. Amassing multiple ideas, or a fluency of ideas, might well be a 
prerequisite for creativity, but, should those ideas be too commonplace, then the 
responses cannot be judged as being creative (Torrence, 1962). For example, when asked 
to list as many as possible uses for a shoe, one can answer with "walking", "running", 
"protect feet", "buy", "gift", etc. However, those categories are hardly considered 
original. On the other hand, someone may singularly answer with "door stop," or "hide 
candy" which could be judged as being a much more original, or creative answer. As 
such, originality may indeed be considered as the most sensitive measure of creativity. 
The results showed that task type, mood, and arousal collectively interacted in 
determining how original the responses were. For Unusual Uses problem, the problem 
type that was thought to simulate the early stages of the creative process, such as 
exploration, the most original answers were given in the positive low and negative high 
conditions, conditions associated with broad attention. According to the differential 
attentional breadth requirement hypothesis, this is the expected pattern if the hypothesis 
were true. The current study's findings support those findings of previous studies of 
mood effects on creativity for the low arousal condition, i.e., findings that responses were 
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judged as being more creative for these problem types in the positive mood condition 
(broad attention) as compared to the negative mood condition (narrow attention), (Abele, 
1992; Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). Within this study there was an opposite trend for 
the high arousal condition; wherein negative high arousal condition responses (the 
condition corresponding to broad attention) were judged as having greater originality 
than positive high condition responses (the condition associated with narrow attentional 
breadth). Thus, conditions related to broad attention were likewise related to a greater 
originality of response than those conditions associated with more narrow attention on the 
problem representing earlier stage of the creative process. 
Conversely, responses for the Consequences problem, the problem that was used 
to simulate the later stages of the creative process, showed an exact opposite pattern. The 
most original responses were those produced in conditions associated with narrow 
attentional breadth (positive high and negative low), as compared to conditions associated 
with broader attention (positive low and negative high). This, again, supported the 
differential attentional breadth requirement for the different stages of the creativity 
hypothesis. These findings help explain the contradictions of earlier studies, i.e., not only 
do mood and arousal interact in influencing creativity, but just as importantly it is the 
breadth of attention that ultimately predicts its quality . 
Usefulness for Unusual Uses (UU) and Consequences (C) Problems. While not 
part of the commonly used creativity measures in and of itself (Torrence, 1962), the 
inclusion of the usefulness measure in this study was motivated by the very definition of 
creative ideas, i.e., that in order to be creative, ideas must not only be novel, but also 
potentially useful (Baas et al., 2008). Since usefulness has been traditionally studied only 
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as part of the quality component of creativity encompassing both originality and 
usefulness (Vosburg, 1998b), there were no predictions developed with regards to this 
measure. 
Consequences task results indicated that a negative mood condition produced 
responses that were rated as significantly more useful than responses in the positive mood 
condition: this was not the case for the Unusual Uses task. For the Unusual Uses task 
there was a trend of positive mood condition responses being rated slightly higher than 
negative mood responses, however, this effect failed to reach significance. These results 
are consistent with previous research reporting better overall performance on the Unusual 
Uses task under a positive mood condition, and better performance on the Consequences 
problem under a negative mood condition (Abele, 1992). High arousal condition 
responses were rated overall as significantly more useful than were low arousal 
responses. 
There are two ways to hypothesize mood's influence on performance: though 
changing how we process information, and through motivation (Kaufmann, 2003). The 
pattern observed with regards to usefulness ratings suggests that usefulness may not be 
influenced so much by attentional breadth, as it may be by motivation. The motivating 
effects of negative mood are well documented in the literature (e.g., Akinola & Mendes, 
2008; Andrews & Thomson, 2009; Kaufmann, 2003). 
Square and Matchstick Arithmetic Problems. While based on theoretical 
predictions, it was expected that attentional breadth would influence performance on 
these types of insight problems, yet no significant difference was detected. One possible 
reason for failing to detect a difference might be due to the fact that a one problem per 
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condition approach is not a sensitive enough measure. Moreover, when compared to other 
tasks, the Square and Matchstick Arithmetic task had the longest allocated solving time 
(4 minutes), a long enough time to allow the transitory effects of emotions and arousal to 
dissipate. Another reason why performance on these problems was not affected as much 
by our manipulation is that these insight problems might be not as pure in terms of 
separation into different stages as other problems used in this research. While solving 
these insight problems, performer goes through the search and restructuring phases 
multiple times, thus it is difficult to parse out different stages predicted by the stage 
creativity model in these problems. 
General Discussion. This research was aimed at clarifying the role of attention in 
the relationship between emotions and creativity. Stage model predicting that attention 
plays a mediating role in this relationship was well supported. While there is research 
investigating how emotions affect creativity, there has been no research to date 
examining attention as a mediating variable in the emotions/creativity relationship. This 
research was the first step to empirically investigate the relationship among emotions, 
attention and creativity simultaneously. New methods were introduced to answer 
questions regarding this triadic relationship. Differing from previous creativity research 
that did not differentiate among creativity outcome measures based on attentional breadth 
requirements, this study used creativity measures that were attention-specific, i.e., tasks 
that require either broad or narrow attention for their completion. 
The stage model of creativity that this research proposed was well supported: both 
positive and negative emotions were shown to differentially facilitate different stages of 
the creative process. The finding that positive emotions promote creativity is not new, a 
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number of previous studies reported similar findings as well. However, other research 
found that at times negative emotions fostered creativity and positive emotions stifled it, 
and this was not easy to explain using the traditional theories of how emotions influence 
creativity. The most widely accepted explanation for positive emotions promoting 
creativity is the spreading activation model that suggests that greater creativity is 
exhibited under a positive mood condition when more distant nodes are activated within a 
network, and more divergent ideas are produced (Isen & colleagues, 1984, 1985, 1987). 
However, the spreading activation model fails to explain why under some circumstances 
positive mood does not lead to better creativity, while negative mood could sometimes 
lead to more creative response. To attempt an explanation of these inconsistencies, others 
have proposed that the purpose of emotional state is to inform an individual about the 
task environment, with positive mood signaling an agreeable condition, and negative 
mood indicating a problematic situation (Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Clore, Schwarz, & 
Conway, 1994). Thus, negative mood fosters a more analytic, 'tight' information 
processing mode, where the problem set is treated more systematically and with greater 
scrutiny, while positive mood leads to a more 'relaxed', heuristic processing mode 
(Fiedler, 1988, 2000). 
With this in mind, bringing attention into the mood-creativity relationship helped 
to explain the many inconsistencies burdening previous research. In the Stage model, 
mood and arousal affect attention, causing it to broaden or narrow. In turn, attention 
influences what information processing mode will be used, narrow (analytic, data driven), 
or broad (heuristic, conceptually driven). Information processing requirements vary 
during the different stages of creativity; a more heuristic information processing mode is 
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associated with the early stages of creativity, while a more analytic information 
processing mode is associated with the later stages of creativity. In this study, different 
stages of creativity were simulated by the use of varied tasks that differed in their 
information processing requirements for their successful completion. As predicted, broad 
attention induced by means of positive low and negative high moods, promoted 
performance on tasks requiring heuristic information processing, while narrow attention 
induced by negative low and positive high mood, was associated with better performance 
on tasks requiring a more analytic information processing mode. 
Introducing differential attentional requirements for the different stages of 
creativity into the emotion-creativity relationship rehabilitates the spreading activation 
model explanation. Broad attention is related to the early stage of creativity, and is 
associated with more conceptual, heuristic processing, when activation of greater number 
of more distant nodes in a network leads to greater number of more unusual ideas being 
produced. On the other hand, the activation of too many nodes in a network is detrimental 
to the latter stage of creativity that is associated with more analytical processing, as it can 
divert attention from the task needing scrutiny. 
Implications. Implications of these findings are numerous, and are applicable to 
those aspects of human endeavor concerned with understanding and nurturing creativity. 
This research shows that the creative process is dependent on attentional breadth, which 
in turn is reliant on differing combinations of arousal levels and emotional valence for the 
fostering of the creative process at its various stages. Accordingly, new, more subtle 
methods for promoting creativity may be called for. While the generation of multiple, 
high-quality ideas has been traditionally considered a hallmark of creativity, stage theory 
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associates idea production with the early stage of creativity, whereas the latter stage 
requires a more analytical approach. This later stage has often been excluded from the 
creative thinking models as non-creative. The current research illuminates the necessity 
of both stages for the creative process to occur, thus emphasizing the need for both global 
and local attention. Implications for this are such that not only processes requiring broad 
attention, such as brainstorming, are necessary for the creativity to occur, but also more 
analytical thinking associated with narrow attention is required. New methods for 
fostering creativity, based on the stage model, should emphasize the importance of both 
positive and negative emotions in the creative process as well as different cognitive 
processes based on more global, or top down along with more local, or bottom up, 
processing. 
Limitations and Future Directions. The shortfall of this research is that it uses a 
convenience sampling of undergraduate university students. Future research needs to 
parse out the effects of emotions and arousal at the different stages of creativity using a 
wider range of creativity tasks. The inclusion of people engaged in creativity in their 
daily lives, such as artists, writers and scientists, may provide a more comprehensive 
picture of the relationship between emotions and creativity. Future directions stemming 
from this research that could elaborate on the problem of study may include mediation 
analysis, investigating the role of attention as a mediator between emotions and 
creativity; the use of more complex creativity measures that are more applied in their 
nature; and finally, the use of more precise, physiological measures of emotions. 
Overall, the pattern of results of this study provided support for the stage theory 
of creativity. Both positive and negative emotions were shown to be beneficial in 
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promoting creativity, though their effect was dependent on arousal. Moreover, attentional 
breadth was shown to mediate the effect of emotions and arousal on the creative process. 
Thus, the emotion/arousal conditions that led to a broadening of attention promoted 
creativity during its early stages, while conditions that narrowed attentional breadth 
fostered creativity in the latter stages. Consequently, the stage theory of creativity 
provides a new way of looking at the relationship between emotions, attention and 
creativity, and helps reconcile the debate of previous research regarding which emotional 
valence promotes and which stifles the creative process. 
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This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. 
Indicate to what degree you feel this way right now, that is. at the present moment. Use 
the following scale to record your answers: 
1 2 3 4 5 
very slightly a little moderately quite a bit extremely 
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